A collection of research on Pakistan, related to extremism, terrorism, violence and security.

  • SrName of PublicationAuthor(s)SummaryOrganizationDateLinkKeywords
    1 Empowering Pakistan’s Civil Society to Counter Global Violent Extremism Hedieh Mirahmadi, Waleed Ziad, Mehreen Farooq and Robert D. Lamb This paper analyzes existing initiatives and their capacities to counter extremism, identifies challenges in program implementation, and develops recommendations for national and provincial strategies to empower civil society as a bulwark against extremism. Brookings Institution 01-01-15 Read online civil society, extremism, militancy, terrorism, capacity-building, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, CVE
    2 Despite Its Siren Song, High-Value Targeting Doesn’t Fit All: Matching Interdiction Patterns to Specific Narcoterrorism and Organized-Crime Contexts Vanda Felbab-Brown The analysis first details why eradication of drug crops is ineffective in fighting the nexus of militancy and the illegal drug trade, using the presumed success story of Colombia as illustration. It then reviews interdiction operations in Colombia both against the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (or FARC) and against the Colombian cartels. This is followed by a discussion of why transplanting such interdiction approaches to Mexico has proven deeply problematic, and an explanation of why middle-level targeting would be a better interdiction posture for Mexico. Fourth, the analysis points out the difficulties of implementing both high-value and middle-level targeting in counternarcotics and anti-Taliban operations in Afghanistan and the easy slippage of policies into indiscriminate broad-brush targeting patterns. Next there is a description of how the growth and successes of signal intelligence have further encouraged the predominance of high-value targeting. Sixth is an exploration of the challenges and pitfalls of standing up specialized interdiction units focused on high-value targeting in contexts of high corruption and poor quality police forces, such as in West Africa. The analysis concludes with a set of policy recommendations designed to shape interdiction postures and patterns to specific threat contexts; it sketches out such targeting patterns for anti-organized crime and counterterrorism contexts, and for the specific cases of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia; Mexico and Central America; and West and East Africa. Brookings Institution 01-10-13 Read online interdiction, high-value targeting (HVT), narcoterrorism, drug trade, organized-crime
    3 Law, Order, and the Future of Democracy in Pakistan Stephen P. Cohen Brookings Institution 21-05-12 Read online law, order, security, justice, democracy
    4 What Focusing on Drones and Detention Misses Kevin Watkins and Rebecca Winthrop Brookings Institution 20-04-12 Read online war on terror, USA, drone strikes, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency
    5 Maximizing Chances for Success in Afghanistan and Pakistan Michael E. O'Hanlon and Bruce Riedel This is a Campaign 2012 policy brief by Bruce Riedel and Michael O’Hanlon proposing ideas for the next president on America’s foreign policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan. Brookings Institution 15-02-12 Read online US foreign policy, afghanistan, war on terror, extremism, militancy, terrorism
    6 Patterns of Conflict in Pakistan: Implications for Policy Mohammad Waseem Brookings Institution 01-01-11 Read online conflict, policy, islamism, terrorism, jihad, military, governance
    7 Obama's War: Prospects for the Conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan Bruce Riedel On coming into office, President Barak Obama immediately assembled a team to assess the US situation in Afghanistan and formulate a strategy for the mission. Heading up this team was Bruce Riedel, a former adviser to Presidents Clinton and Bush and a former CIA officer. This paper, based on a CIGI Signature Lecture given by Mr. Riedel in April 2010, discusses the history of the US war on terror since 9/11, specifically the actors involved in initiating the al-Qaeda declaration of war on the US and its allies, and the recent terrorist plots and attacks linked to al-Qaeda, which demonstrate that al-Qaeda and its allies continue to mount terrorist attacks despite the efforts of the US to thwart terrorism. President Obama inherited a war in Afghanistan that was unsuccessful, under-funded and lacked a clearly defined strategy. The response he developed for Afghanistan is a complex one involving regional and international policies — particularly in Pakistan, where al-Qaeda has a network of insurgent groups — but it also involves military force, diplomacy and changing public opinion concerning the US. This paper assesses the progress that Obama has made in Afghanistan and Pakistan 15 months after taking office, and considers whether the US will actually be able win the war on terror. Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) 07-09-10 Read online afghanistan, pakistan, US foreign policy, war against terror, terrorism, counterterrorism,
    8 Beyond Madrasas: Assessing the Links Between Education and Militancy in Pakistan Corinne Graff and Rebecca Winthrop This report takes a fresh look at the connection between schools, including but not limited to Pakistan’s religious seminaries, known as “madrasas,” and the rising militancy across the country. Center for Universal Education 01-06-10 Read online education, militancy, madrassah reform, extremism, terrorism
    9 Balochistan: The State Versus the Nation Frederic Grare Pakistan’s Balochistan province is descending into anarchy. Only a political agreement between the central government and the nationalist Baloch is likely to end the crisis. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 11-04-13 Read online balochistan, separatist movement, militancy, insurgency
    10 Waiting for the Taliban in Afghanistan Gilles Dorronsoro Without a clear plan for the 2014 withdrawal from Afghanistan, Washington may find the country worse off, in some respects, than it was in 2001. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 20-09-12 Read online war on terror, USA, counterterrorism, taliban, afghanistan
    11 The Menace That Is Lashkar-e-Taiba Ashley J. Tellis For a range of reasons, Lashkar-e-Taiba is the most dangerous terrorist group operating in South Asia after al-Qaeda. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 13-03-12 Read online extremism, terrorism, militancy, lashkar-e-taiba (LeT)
    12 Gambling on Reconciliation to Save a Transition: Perils and Possibilities in Afghanistan Ashley J. Tellis The Obama administration is supporting political reconciliation between the Taliban and coalition forces in Afghanistan in order to safeguard the upcoming security transition, but numerous challenges still loom. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 02-12-11 Read online war on terror, USA, counterterrorism, taliban, afghanistan, US withdrawal
    13 Who Benefits from U.S. Aid to Pakistan? S. Akbar Zaidi A longer-term U.S. engagement and commitment to civilian and development aid in Pakistan might result in strengthening democracy in the country instead of reinforcing the military dominance that thwarts U.S. counterterrorism goals. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 21-09-11 Read online war on terror, USA, counterterrorism, US aid, democracy, terrorism
    14 Stop Enabling Pakistan's Dangerous Dysfunction George Perkovich Because the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan means that Washington will be less dependent on Pakistani supply lines, it presents a rare opportunity to reconsider American policies and practices in Pakistan. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 06-09-11 Read online war on terror, USA, counterterrorism, US withdrawal, democracy, stability
    15 Beradar, Pakistan, and the Afghan Taliban: What Gives? Ashley J. Tellis Recent arrests of high-profile Afghan Taliban leadership by Pakistan do not indicate a strategic change in Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 24-03-10 Read online war on terror, USA, counterterrorism, taliban, afghanistan, US withdrawal
    16 The Metrics of Terrorism and Instability in Pakistan Anthony H. Cordesman A short briefing showing how the patterns of terrorism in Pakistan compare with those in other states, and the patterns in violence and terrorism in Pakistan from 1970 to 2013, using the Global Terrorism Database that is part of the statistical annex to the US State Department Country reports on terrorism issued in April 2014. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 18-12-14 Read online extremism, terrorism, militancy, instability, statistics
    17 Trends in Militancy across South Asia Thomas M. Sanderson, Rick "Ozzie" Nelson, Stephanie Sanok Kostro, Zachary I. Fellman and Rob Wise The bulk of international counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and related efforts over the last decade have focused on targeting a select few extremist organizations such as al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. Yet looming security transitions, international fiscal strictures, demographic trends, religious and ethnic tensions, popular dissatisfaction, and weak governance are likely having significant and worrying effects on a wide array of militant actors around the world. A narrow focus on those groups perceived to be the most immediate threats has, at times, come at the cost of a broader understanding of militancy and how it may manifest in a given region. This void can, in part, be blamed on the often-necessary structural limitations placed upon the analysis of violent extremism and militancy. Territorial and functional boundaries, combined with the need to respond to today’s exigencies, limit practitioners’ ability to consider threats on a regional basis. This inability to “see the whole board” can prevent practitioners from identifying commonalities, nascent trends, and strategic shifts among groups. Without a sense of how militancy may evolve in the future, nations have no choice but to adopt atomized and reactionary security policies. Because of these shortfalls, additional efforts must be made to detect and understand the strategic and tactical changes that may be afoot among militant groups. This report seeks to address this need by identifying region-wide trends so that holistic and comprehensive strategies to combat militancy may be enacted. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 15-04-13 Read online extremism, terrorism, militancy, trends, South Asia
    18 Religious Movements, Militancy, and Conflict in South Asia: Cases from India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan Robert D. Lamb, Sadika Hameed, Joy Aoun, Liora Danan, Kathryn Mixon, and Denise St. Peter Religious institutions and leaders are critically important in many conflict and post-conflict cases, and religious values often motivate either violence or peacebuilding. This report, part of an ongoing research effort to assess what is substantively distinctive about religion and the roles it can play in conflict, explores the ways that religion has been a factor in militant groups’ approaches to gaining support in India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Religion is a relevant factor in key ways that these groups build support, including their relations with the state, service provision, kinship and patronage networks, and diaspora outreach. The roles religion plays in these categories are complicated and not always intuitive. Militant groups must find ways to limit central government pressures on their activities, including religious ones. These same groups can risk alienating local populations when they pair strong ideological or religious stances with service provision, or operate through patronage networks that are too rigid or not sufficiently inclusive. And global religious networks can inspire diaspora communities to pursue violent activity against their adopted governments. In South Asia, these groups’ activities matter because they threaten the ability of states to maintain peace and stability internally and complicate relations between already tense neighbors. Such instability has grave implications for U.S. national security. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 13-07-12 Read online extremism, religion, terrorism, religious movements, militancy, trends, South Asia
    19 Religion and Militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan: A Literature Review Mariam Mufti The importance of studying the rise of Islamic radicalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan cannot be overemphasized. Both countries have experienced serious threats from radical Islamic groups, and the ideological and strategic nature of radical Islam in the region has changed over the years. This report presents the results of a comprehensive review of the English-language literature on militant Islamic movements in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Islamic radical groups, often viewed as monolithic, are in reality far from homogeneous in outlook, religious beliefs, or the strategies and tactics they use to achieve their goals. Clearly, no mere classification of these groups in the form of typologies that attempt to capture their ideological diversity or the development of their networks will be particularly useful in determining how the U.S. government and other nations ought to engage with them. This review thus focuses on the diversity of religious beliefs held by non-state armed groups (militants) and the relationship between those beliefs and their overall objectives and activities. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 29-06-12 Read online extremism, religion, terrorism, literature review, militancy, afghanistan
    20 Subnational Governance, Service Delivery, and Militancy in Pakistan Robert D. Lamb, Sadika Hameed This report presents the results of a study on whether a link exists between the rise of militants and the quality of subnational governance in Pakistan and, if one exists, what the United States can do about it, if anything. Its basic finding is that Pakistan’s governance problems are not caused by militancy, and its problems with militancy are not directly caused by its governance problems, but improving governance will be necessary (though not sufficient) to counter militancy. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 12-06-12 Read online governance, service sector, extremism, terrorism, militancy, democracy
    21 Governance and Militancy in Pakistan’s Southern Punjab Region S.R. Mehboob The politics of Southern Punjab have historically been determined by the political agendas of large national parties, to the virtual exclusion of any localized priorities. The changing regimes of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) or the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) rarely dealt with specific issues and demands of districts in Southern Punjab in any organized manner. A similar pattern also emerged during the rule of President Pervez Musharraf. The only occasion when some of the local issues received prominence was during the local bodies’ elections of 2001 and 2005, when local politicians highlighted the grievances of Southern Punjab and brought them to attention at the provincial level. As soon as elected governments took over at the provincial and national level during 2008, even this window of demand articulation was closed as different local government tiers were made dysfunctional. However, in recent years Southern Punjab’s local agenda has been recognized, at least in word, by some mainstream political parties, including both the “N” and “Q” factions of the Pakistan Muslim League. Some parties highlighted underdevelopment, inequality, and other grievances as part of the parties’ campaign platforms. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 12-03-12 Read online governance, militancy, South Punjab, terrorism, democracy
    22 Governance and Militancy in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province S.R. Mehboob The traditional weaknesses in service delivery within Pakistan’s provincial and district governments have arisen from the complex interplay of several factors. Resource mobilization for essential services has always been a challenge for provincial governments, which typically have been dependent on federal handouts. International development partners and donor agencies have regularly supported the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), supplementing the limited own-source revenues of the provincial government. The introduction of LGO 2001 provided a window of opportunity to address local needs, but these organizations and others did not capitalize appropriately on this opportunity. Moreover, a series of crises and destabilizing factors in recent decades appears to have further deepened the actual and perceived failures of governance in KPK. For example, the influx of Afghan refugees during the 1980s and 1990s placed stress on systems and structures in many areas of KPK. Similarly, the fallout in Afghanistan from the post-2001 terrorist events in the United States, the growing militancy, the violence in Swat and the tribal areas, the earthquake of 2005, and the floods of 2010 further pressured an already overstressed system. This report offers recommendations for reform that will not be easy, the author acknowledges, but it is worth making the effort to build on those reforms that have succeeded and the “bright spots” that, despite KPK’s reputation to the contrary, do exist in the province. Pervasive inefficiency and outright corruption within political institutions have stalled progress, and the inherent weaknesses of systems and institutions within KPK have diluted some of the positive outcomes. But mainstream political activism and local governance reforms have created a sense of inclusion among the citizens and have offered some visible improvements in service delivery over time. All this suggests that progress is possible. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 30-12-11 Read online governance, militancy, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, terrorism, democracy
    23 Governance and Militancy in Pakistan's Khyber Agency Mehlaqa Samdani In mid-October 2011, thousands of families were fleeing Khyber, one of the seven tribal agencies in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), to refugee camps or relatives living outside of FATA. Their flight was in response to the announcement by the Pakistani military that it was undertaking a fresh round of operations against militant groups operating in the area. Militants have been active in Khyber (and FATA more generally) for several years. Some have used the area as a safe haven, resting between their own military operations in Afghanistan or other parts of Pakistan. Others have competed locally for influence by providing justice or security services, by decrying the ruling elite’s failure to provide these and other services to the local population, or by using force against those people the militants consider threatening or un-Islamic. The Pakistani military’s actions against militants in Khyber have already driven most of these nonstate groups out of the more populated areas and into Khyber’s remote Tirah Valley. But beyond that, the government of Pakistan has failed to implement most of the legal and political changes required to reform Khyber’s dysfunctional governance system to meet the needs of its residents. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 13-12-11 Read online governance, militancy, Khyber Agency, terrorism, democracy
    24 Governance and Militancy in Pakistan’s Chitral District Danny Cutherell Chitral, the northernmost district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) Province, lies at the extreme northwest of Pakistan. It shares a border with Afghanistan’s Badakhshan, Nuristan, and Kunar Provinces to the north and west, with Gilgit-Baltistan region to the east, and with the Kohistan, Swat, and Dir Districts to the south. Geography is at the root of many of Chitral’s unique characteristics. Indeed, its geography and location play an important role in shaping its culture. The district consists of a series of valleys that vary in accessibility, but generally Chitral is not easily traveled. While this research was under way, every single road into Chitral was being disrupted by flooding, as were many of the roads linking the various valleys. And this event was not entirely unusual. This paper is part of a series on subnational governance and militancy in Pakistan. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 30-11-11 Read online governance, militancy, Chitral, terrorism, democracy
    25 Governance and Militancy in Pakistan’s Swat Valley Justine Fleischner In 2009, the Swat Valley became a focal point of Pakistan’s war against militancy and terrorism. The government signed a peace agreement effectively ceding control of the district to the local Taliban faction, allowing it to enforce its interpretation of Islamic law. By April 2009, Taliban fighters had swept into neighboring Buner district and were portrayed by the international media as being on the verge of a siege of Islamabad. The following month, Pakistan’s military forces launched a campaign to regain control of Swat. The campaign succeeded, but the fighting displaced hundreds of thousands of people from Swat into nearby areas, creating a serious humanitarian crisis in the country’s northwestern region. A little more than a year later, as many of those internally displaced persons were returning to a newly stabilized Swat, the worst flooding in Pakistan’s history created a new crisis that threatened to undo what little progress on reconstruction the military or civilian governments had achieved. In early 2011, two years into the longest sustained military operation in Pakistan’s history, the army began a phased withdrawal from the surrounding districts of Shangla and Buner. While welcomed news, the details of the plan have not been made public, and the ability of local security forces to maintain order is untested. More importantly, the capacity of local governance officials to lead reconstruction efforts and improve service delivery in justice, education, and health may be constrained by the absence of a cohesive local governance framework. While there have been some significant changes to the laws and institutions that provide justice in Swat, namely the implementation of the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation, the formal judicial system has escaped much needed reform, and there are currently 2,500 alleged terrorist suspects being illegally detained by the military. There has been no talk of community reconciliation and very little in terms of oversight reform. This paper addresses these issues and others related to governance and militancy in the Sway Valley. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 14-10-11 Read online governance, militancy, Swat, terrorism, democracy
    26 Governance and Militancy in Afghanistan and Pakistan Robert D. Lamb The CSIS Program on Crisis, Conflict, and Cooperation (C3), formerly the PCR Project, has studied the link between the rise of nonstate armed groups (or militants, for the sake of simplicity) and the quality of local governance in Afghanistan and Pakistan: whether a link exists and, if so, what the United States can do about it, if anything. This research, based on more than 250 field interviews and an extensive review of published literature, found that most militant groups do not rely on governance and service provision to gain access to areas or populations that are operationally or strategically useful to them; instead, they use intimidation or personal connections such as tribal or kinship networks. Some groups do exploit grievances related to weak or corrupt governance (e.g., recruiting victims of police extortion), and a subset of those groups offer security, justice, education, disaster assistance, or (very rarely) health care in an effort to win the support and protection of a community. Within that subset, service provision has given some militants certain tactical and operational advantages, such as access to potential recruits (e.g., in free religious schools) or sources of funding (e.g., through front charities). But with a few important exceptions, that has not generally translated into significant strategic advantages, such as broad public support or lasting territorial control. Militants, it seems, are no better at service provision than the Pakistani or Afghan governments. They often squander their gains by turning too heavy-handed against local populations or becoming as corrupt as the government officials they were trying to displace, alienating their former beneficiaries. To the degree they win popular support, it is due less to the appeal of their ideology than to the fact that people who live in desperate or humiliating circumstances generally accept help when it is offered, regardless of the source. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 16-06-11 Read online governance, militancy, afghanistan, terrorism, democracy
    27 Measuring Perceptions about the Pashtun People Robert D. Lamb, Amin Tarzi This report documents the results of a study about beliefs about the Pashtun people. The purpose was to identify the range of perceptions or misperceptions about Pashtun communities by cataloging “stereotypes” about Pashtuns held by English-speaking policymakers, experts, and other opinion leaders. The authors interviewed 52 officials and experts in the United States, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, and analyzed 138 articles drawn from recent academic and popular sources. Pashtuns were most commonly characterized as proud, victimized, sectarian, tribal, and hospitable; they were not stereotyped as warlike, misogynous, illiterate, conservative, or medieval. Pashtun diversity was generally acknowledged, as were the changes Pashtuns have experienced in recent decades. Some saw Pashtuns as natural allies of the Taliban, while others considered them more opportunistic, which suggests there are competing schools of thought about counterinsurgency in the region (i.e., population-centric versus enemy-centric strategies). The report concludes by noting the absence of broad, deep, and, most importantly, current knowledge about the Pashtuns. Having such knowledge would be a good in itself, but would also help policymakers and strategists avoid having to make untested assumptions about how important populations might respond to different activities—whether military or political. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 16-03-11 Read online race, ethnicity, conflict, identity, Pashtun, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, militancy, extremism
    28 The Afghanistan-Pakistan War at the End of 2011: Strategic Failure? Talk Without Hope? Tactical Success? Spend Not Build (And Then Stop Spending)? Anthony H. Cordesman The US faces hard decisions in the Afghanistan/Pakistan War that are growing steadily harder as the time before transition runs out, the US faces growing budget pressures, and the situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan becomes more unstable. The Burke Chair has prepared a report that assesses the chances for strategic success based on new US government, UN, and NGO reporting. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 15-11-11 Read online war on terror, afghanistan, US foreign policy, militancy, extremism, terrorism
    29 Afghanistan and Pakistan: Continuing Security Challenges For the United States Anthony H. Cordesman The Burke Chair has drawn together a wide range of official sources and data from the US, ISAF, World Bank, and USCENTCOM to provide a basis for analyzing and making decisions on the issues involving US war on terror. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 23-09-11 Read online war on terror, afghanistan, US foreign policy, militancy, extremism, terrorism, security
    30 Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Art of the Possible: Conference Report Robert D. Lamb, Sadika Hameed, Joy Aoun, Zeina Boustani On June 14, 2011, more than 200 policymakers and experts participated in an invitation-only, full-day working meeting at CSIS to discuss a constructive, realistic way forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The main topics were Afghan governance, the Afghan security sector, and Pakistani cooperation. Informed in part by expert presentations on these topics, participants formed 17 simultaneous working groups asking: What accomplishments are essential? What are not essential? And what lasting gains can realistically be achieved? What most participants felt was important is for the Obama administration to publicly identify what it believes to be the minimal essential requirements for Afghan stability and U.S. security and the minimal essential conditions on the ground that would enable those requirements to be met. By offering guidance on what accomplishments are essential, the administration would encourage activities on the ground to be prioritized more constructively. As a modest contribution to that guidance, this report provides the key observations and suggestions that emerged from the conference discussions, focusing mainly on those issues on which there was broad (though never unanimous) agreement among the convened experts and policymakers. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 13-07-11 Read online war on terror, afghanistan, US foreign policy, militancy, extremism, terrorism, security
    31 Pakistan: Violence vs. Stability Anthony H. Cordesman, Varun Vira The Burke Chair at CSIS has developed an working draft of a net assessment that addresses each of these threats and areas of internal violence in depth, and does so within in the broader context of the religious, ideological, ethnic, sectarian, and tribal causes at work; along with Pakistan’s problems in ideology, politics, governance, economics and demographics. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 07-06-11 Read online extremism, terrorism, militancy, violence, instability, governance, democracy
    32 Women, Violence and Conflict in Pakistan International Crisis Group (ICG) Eight years into its democratic transition, violence against women is still endemic in Pakistan, amid a climate of impunity and state inaction. Discriminatory legislation and a dysfunctional criminal justice system have put women at grave risk. Targeted by violent extremists with an overt agenda of gender repression, women’s security is especially threatened in the conflict zones in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). On 8 March, International Women’s Day, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif vowed that his government would take all necessary legislative and administrative steps to protect and empower women. If this pledge was in earnest, his Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) government should end institutionalised violence and discrimination against women, including by repealing unjust laws, countering extremist threats, particularly in KPK and FATA, and involving women and their specially relevant perspectives in design of state policies directly affecting their security, including strategies to deal with violent extremist groups. Women in the past were the principal victims of state policies to appease violent extremists. After democracy’s return, there has been some progress, particularly through progressive legislation, much of it authored by committed women’s rights activists in the federal and provincial legislatures, facilitated by their increased numbers in parliament. Yet, the best of laws will provide little protection so long as social attitudes toward women remain biased, police officers are not held accountable for failing to investigate gender-based crimes, the superior judiciary does not hold the subordinate judiciary accountable for failing to give justice to women survivors of violence, and discriminatory laws remain on the books. Laws, many remnants of General Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamisation in the 1970s and 1980s, continue to deny women their constitutional right to gender equality and fuel religious intolerance and violence against them. Their access to justice and security will remain elusive so long as legal and administrative barriers to political and economic empowerment remain, particularly the Hudood Ordinances (1979), FATA’s Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) (1901) and the Nizam-e-Adl (2009) in KPK’s Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). The government has a constitutional obligation and international commitments, including under the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), to combat gender inequality and remove such barriers to women’s empowerment. Repealing discriminatory legislation and enforcing laws that protect women, including by ensuring that they have access to a gender-responsive police and courts, are essential to ending the impunity that promotes violence against women. The extent to which rights violations go unpunished is particularly alarming in FATA and KPK, where women are subjected to state-sanctioned discrimination, militant violence, religious extremism and sexual violence. Militants target women’s rights activists, political leaders and development workers without consequences. The prevalence of informal justice mechanisms in many parts of Pakistan, particularly in Pakhtunkhwa and FATA, are also highly discriminatory toward women; and the government’s indiscriminate military operations, which have displaced millions, have further aggravated the challenges they face in the conflict zones. In KPK and FATA, and indeed countrywide, women’s enhanced meaningful presence in decision-making, including political participation as voters and in public office, will be central to sustainable reform. Pakistan should invest in their empowerment and reflect their priorities in all government policies, including counter-insurgency and peacebuilding efforts. All too often, women comprise a majority of both the intended victims of the insurgency and the unintended victims of the counter-insurgency response. National and provincial legislation to enhance protections for women is a step in the right direction, but much more is needed to safeguard them against violence and injustice and ultimately to consolidate Pakistan’s democratic transition. International Crisis Group (ICG) 08-04-15 Read online women, extremism, militancy, terrorism, instability, violence
    33 Policing Urban Violence in Pakistan International Crisis Group (ICG) Endemic violence in Pakistan’s urban centres signifies the challenges confronting the federal and provincial governments in restoring law and order and consolidating the state’s writ. The starkest example is Karachi, which experienced its deadliest year on record in 2013, with 2,700 casualties, mostly in targeted attacks, and possibly 40 per cent of businesses fleeing the city to avoid growing extortion rackets. However, all provincial capitals as well as the national capital suffer from similar problems and threats. A national rethink of overly militarised policy against crime and militancy is required. Islamabad and the four provincial governments need to develop a coherent policy framework, rooted in providing good governance and strengthening civilian law enforcement, to tackle criminality and the jihadi threat. Until then, criminal gangs and jihadi networks will continue to wreak havoc in the country’s big cities and put its stability and still fragile democratic transition at risk. Some of the worst assaults on religious and sectarian minorities in 2013 occurred in Quetta and Peshawar, including the 10 January suicide and car bomb attack that killed over 100, mostly Shias, in Quetta; the 16 February terror attack that killed more than 80, again mostly Shias, in Quetta’s Hazara town; and the 22 September bombing of a Peshawar church that killed more than 80 people, mostly Christians. The provincial capitals of Peshawar, Quetta, Karachi and Lahore are bases of operations and financing for a range of extremist groups and criminal gangs that exploit poor governance and failing public infrastructure to establish recruitment and patronage networks. As urban populations grow, the competition over resources, including land and water, has become increasingly violent. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK)’s capital, Peshawar, and Balochistan’s capital, Quetta, are hostage to broader regional security trends. The conflict in Afghanistan and cross-border ties between Pakistan and Afghan militants have undermined stability in KPK and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Military-dictated counter-insurgency policies, swinging between indiscriminate force and appeasement deals with tribal militants have failed to restore the peace, and instead further empowered violent extremists. Police in Peshawar, which has borne the brunt of militant violence and where violence is at an all-time high, lack political support and resources and appear increasingly incapable of meeting the challenge. Indeed, while militants and criminals frequently target that city, the force is powerless to act when they then seek haven in bordering FATA agencies, because its jurisdiction, according to the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) 1901, does not extend to these areas. Balochistan’s location, bordering on southern Afghanistan, the Afghan Taliban’s homeland, and longstanding Pakistani policies of backing Afghan Islamist proxies are partly responsible for the growth of militancy and extremism that now threatens Quetta. Aided by a countrywide network, Sunni extremists have killed hundreds of Shias there, while their criminal allies have helped to fill jihadi coffers, and their own, through kidnappings for ransom. Civilian law enforcement agencies cannot counter this rising tide of sectarian violence and criminality, since they are marginalised by the military and its paramilitary arms. Continuing to dictate and implement security policy, the military remains focused on brutally supressing a province-wide Baloch insurgency, fuelled by the denial of political and economic autonomy. The end result is more Baloch alienation and more jihadi attacks undermining peace in the provincial capital. In Karachi, Pakistan’s largest city, which generates around 70 per cent of national GDP, much of the violence is driven by the state’s failure to meet the demands of a fast growing population and to enforce the law. Over the past decade, the competition over resources and turf has become increasingly violent. Criminals and militant groups attempt to lure youth by providing scarce services, work and a purpose in life. Demographic changes fuel ethno-political tensions and rivalries, accentuated by the main political parties: the mostly Sindhi Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) representing mohajirs and the predominately Pashtun Awami National Party (ANP) forging links with criminal gangs. Like Quetta and Peshawar, Karachi is a major target of violent sectarian groups such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), which has its home base in Punjab. Since the LeJ and other major jihadi groups such as the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba/Jamaat-ud-Dawa (LeT/JD) and the Jaish-e-Mohammed conduct operations within and outside the country from bases in Punjab, the provincial government and police are central to any comprehensive counter-terrorism effort. It is imperative that both be reformed if the threat is to be addressed effectively. Countering jihadi networks also requires coordination and collaboration between the federal and provincial governments and law enforcement institutions. Pakistani policymakers must acknowledge and address the socio-economic disparities that lead to crime and militancy in the urban centres. Stemming the spread of urban violence also requires efficient, accountable, civilian-led policing. Yet, the forces in all four provincial capitals are hampered by lack of professional and operational autonomy, inadequate personnel and resources and poor working conditions. Instead of relying on the military or paramilitary forces to restore order, the provincial governments should guarantee security of tenure for police officers, end all interference in police operations and raise police morale, including by acknowledging and supporting a force that has been repeatedly targeted by terrorists. It is equally important for all four provinces to reform and modernise the urban policing system to meet present needs. Above all, the state must adopt a policy of zero tolerance toward all forms of militancy. Proposed plans by the federal and KPK governments to negotiate with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), without preconditions or a roadmap, are unwise. Such a strategy is bound to fail, as have successive military-devised peace deals with tribal militants in recent years that only expanded the space for jihadi networks in FATA, KPK and countrywide. International Crisis Group (ICG) 23-01-14 Read online urban violence, political violence, minorities, extremism, militancy, governance, democracy, terrorism
    34 Drones: Myths And Reality In Pakistan International Crisis Group (ICG) Nine years after the first U.S. drone strike in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in 2004, the U.S. refuses to officially acknowledge the CIA-run program, while Pakistan denies consenting to it. This secrecy undermines efforts to assess the program’s legality or its full impact on FATA’s population. It also diverts attention from a candid examination of the roots of militancy in the poorly governed tribal belt bordering southern and eastern Afghanistan and how best to address them. Drone strikes may disrupt FATA-based militant groups’ capacity to plan and execute cross-border attacks on NATO troops and to plot attacks against the U.S. homeland, but they cannot solve the fundamental problem. The ability of those groups to regroup, rearm and recruit will remain intact so long as they enjoy safe havens on Pakistani territory and efforts to incorporate FATA into the constitutional mainstream are stifled. Since 2004, there have been at least 350 drone strikes in FATA, mostly in North Waziristan, South Waziristan and Kurram agencies. These have killed significant numbers of al-Qaeda leaders and senior militant commanders of both the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban, but also scores of innocent civilians, in part because of so-called “signature” strikes that target groups of men based on behaviour patterns associated with terrorist activity rather than known identities. Even with so-called “personality” strikes in which the individual has been targeted based on evidence of identity, accurate assessments of collateral damage are impossible. Independent researchers, facing significant military and militant-imposed barriers to access in FATA, rely primarily on media reports that depend largely on anonymous U.S. government and/or Pakistani military sources – each with a vested interest in under- or over-reporting civilian casualties. Neither is it possible to gauge the real feelings of civilians who live in the areas of drone operations. Fearing retaliation from the militants or the military, respondents choose their words carefully. For the same reasons, it is hard to determine with any precision the strategic impact of the drone campaign. While reported signature strikes may in particular fuel local alienation, at the same time, the deaths of senior, highly experienced commanders are certainly a hard blow for the militants. Pakistan’s attitude towards drones borders on the schizophrenic. Rather than inherently opposing the strikes, its leadership, in particular its military, seeks greater control over target selection. This is often to punish enemies, but sometimes, allegedly, to protect militants who enjoy good relations with, or support from, the military – leaders of the Haqqani network, for example, or some Pakistani Taliban groups with whom the military has made peace deals. Ample evidence exists of tacit Pakistani consent and active cooperation with the drone program, contradicting the official posture that it violates the country’s sovereignty. This includes acknowledgements by former President Pervez Musharraf in April 2013 and by then-Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani in 2008 and 2010. After the October 2001 U.S.-led intervention in Afghanistan, Musharraf’s military regime permitted a substantial CIA presence in at least two airbases, Shamsi in southern Balochistan and Shahbaz in Sindh’s Jacobabad district, for intelligence gathering and collaboration; both were used to gather intelligence for drone strikes and possibly even to conduct them. This cooperation and collaboration signified Pakistan’s assent to the program. It was not until the November 2011 NATO air raid that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers near the Afghan border and months after the U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, vitiating relations with Washington, that Islamabad demanded the U.S. vacate one of the bases. While drones have not themselves caused the political falling out between Washington and Islamabad, the Pakistani military has attempted to take advantage of downturns in the relationship to leverage greater control over drone targets. Even after the U.S. vacated the Shamsi base in December 2011, some level of Pakistani sanction for the strikes continues. While condemning attacks against its anti-Afghanistan-oriented jihadi allies, such as the August 2012 killing of Badruddin Haqqani, the Haqqani network’s third in command, it supports strikes against its internal enemies, such as Maulvi Dadullah, the leader of the Pakistani Taliban in Bajaur Agency, killed in a drone strike in Afghanistan’s Kunar province that same month. The U.S. hit list now reportedly includes Mullah Fazlullah, the leader of a Pakistani Taliban faction in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s (KPK’s) Malakand region, ousted in a military operation in 2009, and now operating out of Afghanistan’s Nuristan province. The legal debate does not pivot only on Pakistani consent. Both countries are subject to numerous obligations under international law and their respective domestic legislation. Islamabad has a constitutional and international obligation to protect the lives of citizens and non-citizens alike on its territory. Even if it seeks U.S. assistance against individuals and groups at war with the state, Pakistan is still obliged to ensure that its actions and those of the U.S. comply with the principles, among others, of distinction and proportionality under International Humanitarian Law, and ideally to give independent observers unhindered access to the areas targeted. The Obama administration should terminate any practice, such as the reported signature strikes, that does not comply with principles of international humanitarian and human rights law. It must also introduce transparency to the drone program, including its governing rules, how targets are selected and how civilian damage is weighed. By transferring its management from the CIA to the Defense Department, the administration would establish clearer lines of authority and accountability, including greater congressional and judicial oversight. Distorted through hyper-nationalistic segments of the Pakistani media and hi-jacked by political hardliners, the domestic Pakistani debate on the impact of drone operations has overshadowed a more urgent discussion about the state’s obligation to its citizens in FATA, who are denied constitutional rights and protections. In the absence of formal courts and law enforcement institutions, the state fails to protect FATA’s residents from jihadi and other criminal groups. The core of any Pakistani counter-terrorism strategy in this area should be to incorporate FATA into the country’s legal and constitutional mainstream. This should be accompanied by a national counter-terrorism policy that prioritises the modernisation of a failing criminal justice sector, thus enabling the state to bring violent extremists to justice. While the U.S. and international debate over legitimacy and control of drone strikes is highly important, drones are not a long-term solution to the problem they are being deployed to solve – destruction of local, regional and wider transnational jihadis who operate out of Pakistan’s tribal belt. The U.S. policy should be two-fold: pressuring the Pakistan military to abandon any logistical or other support to violent extremists, including by more rigorously applying existing conditions on security assistance; and encouraging and supporting efforts by the elected leadership in Islamabad to extend the state’s writ to FATA. Similarly, if Pakistan is genuinely committed to ending strikes on its territory, it should realise that its strongest case against the U.S. drone program lies in overhauling an anachronistic governance system so as to establish fundamental constitutional rights and genuine political enfranchisement in FATA, along with a state apparatus capable of upholding the rule of law and bringing violent extremists to justice. International Crisis Group (ICG) 21-05-13 Read online drone attacks, war on terror, afghanistan, terrorism, extremism, militancy
    35 Pakistan: Countering Militancy in PATA International Crisis Group (ICG) Pakistan’s Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA), which include Swat and six neighbouring districts and areas in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (KPK), remains volatile more than three years after military operations sought to oust Islamist extremists. Militant groups such as the Sunni extremist Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) and its Pakistani Taliban-linked Fazlullah faction are no longer as powerful in Swat and other parts of PATA as they were in 2008 and early 2009, but their leaders and foot soldiers remain at large, regularly attacking security personnel and civilians. If this once dynamic region is to stabilise, PATA’s governance, security and economic revival must become a top priority for the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP)-led government in Islamabad and the Awami National Party (ANP)-led government in Peshawar – and for their successors following the next general elections. While the militants continue to present the main physical threat, the military’s poorly conceived counter-insurgency strategies, heavy-handed methods and failure to restore responsive and accountable civilian administration and policing are proving counter-productive, aggravating public resentment and widening the gulf between PATA’s citizens and the state. Meanwhile neither the federal nor the KPK provincial government is fully addressing the security concerns of residents. Public and political support for action against the TNSM and allied Pakistani Taliban networks in Swat and its neighbouring districts remains strong, demonstrated by the outrage against the 9 October 2012 attack by Mullah Fazlullah’s Taliban faction on Malala Yousafzai, a Swat-based fourteen-year-old activist for girls’ right to education. That attack has also further eroded public confidence in the military’s claims of having dismantled the insurgency and underscores the grave security challenges that PATA’s residents face. The military’s continued control over the security agenda, governance and administration in PATA and the state’s failure to equip KPK’s police force with the tools and authority it needs to tackle extremist violence lie at the heart of the security and governance challenges. Some serious efforts have been made to enhance police capacity, functioning and presence on the streets, including by increasing the size of the force and the number of police stations, particularly in Swat. However, they are insufficient. The KPK police should be properly trained, equipped, and accountable. Islamabad and Peshawar, KPK’s provincial capital, need to abolish parallel law enforcement entities such as Levies, dismantle state-supported tribal lashkars (militias) and give KPK’s police the lead in enforcing the law and bringing extremists to justice. Yet, the complexities of PATA’s legal framework still make upholding the rule of law a daunting task. Unlike the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), PATA is subject to Pakistan’s basic criminal and civil law framework and falls under the jurisdiction of the provincial KPK legislature (in addition to the National Assembly) and the Peshawar High Court and Supreme Court. However, under Article 247 of the constitution, laws apply to PATA, as in FATA, only if specifically extended by the governor (the federation’s representative), with the president’s consent. Since formally joining KPK (then called Northwest Frontier Province) in 1969, PATA has also been governed by various parallel legal systems that have undermined constitutional rights and isolated it from the rest of KPK. More recent reforms have only expanded that isolation. Despite public opposition to Islamist militancy in Swat and neighbouring PATA districts, the ANP-led provincial government has not repealed the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation 2009, which imposed Sharia (Islamic law) in PATA as part of a military-devised peace deal with the Taliban-allied TNSM in April 2009. In August 2011, President Asif Ali Zardari promulgated the Actions (in Aid of Civil Power) Regulation 2011 (AACP) for PATA and FATA, vesting the military with virtually unchecked powers of arrest and detention and further undermining fundamental rights and the rule of law. While the AACP provides legal cover for the military’s human rights abuses, the imposition of Sharia has made effective and accountable governance elusive. Efforts to revive a shattered economy, once heavily dependent on tourism, have also faltered, and pressing humanitarian needs remain unmet because of continued instability and short-sighted military-dictated policies and methods. These include travel restrictions on foreigners, stringent requirements for domestic and international NGOs, abrasive and intrusive questioning at military checkposts and the military’s deep economic encroachment. To overcome PATA’s rising security challenges, the national and provincial leaderships should reclaim the political space ceded to the military. Islamabad and Peshawar must develop and assume ownership over a reform agenda that ends PATA’s legal and political isolation, strengthens a deteriorating justice system, revokes laws that undermine constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights and fully integrates the region into KPK. International Crisis Group (ICG) 15-01-13 Read online PATA, tribal areas, Swat, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, militancy, terrorism, extremism, FATA
    36 Pakistan: No End To Humanitarian Crises International Crisis Group (ICG) With three years of devastating floods putting the lives and livelihoods of at least four million citizens at risk, and military operations against militants displacing thousands more in the conflict zones of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Pakistan’s humanitarian crises need urgent domestic and international attention. Since the democratic transition began in 2008, some progress has been made, but much more is needed to build the federal and provincial governments’ disaster and early recovery response. Efforts to enhance civilian ownership and control have also had mixed results, particularly in the conflict zones, where the military remains the dominant actor. To effectively confront the challenges, the most urgent tasks remain to strengthen the civilian government’s capacity to plan for and cope with humanitarian crises and to prioritise social sector and public infrastructure development. It is equally important that all assistance and support be non-dis­crim­i­na­to­ry and accompanied by credible mechanisms for citizens to hold public officials accountable. The military’s suspicions of and animosity toward foreign actors undermine efforts to improve the humanitarian community’s coordination with government agencies, and allegations that humanitarian aid is a cover for foreign intelligence activity threatens staff and beneficiaries’ security. Radical Islamist lobbies, including militant groups opposed to donor involvement, exploit the gaps in assistance. Sporadic, selective, and heavy-handed military operations have, in 2012 alone, displaced hundreds of thousands, particularly in FATA’s Khyber Agency. While conflict-induced displacement is now on a lesser scale in KPK’s Malakand region than in the spring of 2009, when a major military offensive against Swat-based militants displaced 2.8 million, the army’s failure to root out militancy has resulted in constant displacements. In 2010, countrywide floods affected some twenty million, with massive destruction to infrastructure and livelihoods. Heavy monsoon rains in the following year further weakened dams and irrigation infrastructure, flooding large parts of Sindh, particularly its southern districts, and Balochistan. A fragile infrastructure, combined with deforestation and climate change, has heightened the risk of recurrent flooding. The 2012 monsoon season has already caused massive devastation in upper Sindh, Punjab’s south-western districts of Dera Ghazi Khan and Rajanpur and parts of eastern Balochistan. Conflict- and flood-induced displacement has brought economic hardships – and the state’s limited capacity for development and service provision – into sharp relief. It has also increased the potential for conflict, with radical Islamist groups gaining ample opportunities to recruit those most affected by humanitarian crises. In areas of displacement in KPK and FATA where the military still holds sway, short-term security objectives often determine eligibility for state assistance. Additional restrictions have been placed on the activities and access of international and local NGOs and other humanitarian actors, particularly since the May 2011 U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden near a major military academy in Abbottabad. While radical jihadi organisations, such as the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JD) – the renamed Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) – are operating freely, using their charity fronts to win support, the state’s failure to provide adequate and timely assistance is aggravating public resentment, undermining its credibility and that of its international partners. More than three years after the military declared victory over Swat-based militants, soldiers remain deployed in KPK’s Malakand region. While their presence on the streets creates a semblance of security, the military’s dominant role in maintaining order, reconstructing public infrastructure and determining the post-conflict agenda undermines civilian government capacity. The rule of law has also been undermined, particularly by the Actions (in Aid of Civil Power) Regulations 2011 for both FATA and the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA), of which Swat is a part. These regulations give the military the authority to detain militant suspects indefinitely, including in internment centres that reportedly house over 1,100 detainees, thus violating constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights of fair trial and legal appeal. Similarly, the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation 2009, imposing Sharia (Islamic law) in PATA, undermines basic legal rights and excludes the region from the constitutional mainstream. The social impact of flood- and conflict-induced displacements is no less severe. In Sindh, economic deprivation resulting from recurrent floods has provoked a spike in crime that could spiral into a major law and order problem, while creating opportunities for jihadi organisations to exploit public alienation. Tackling the causes and consequences of these humanitarian crises goes beyond humanitarian action and will require state policies that promote more equitable social and economic development and guarantee legal protections and political inclusion. International Crisis Group (ICG) 09-10-12 Read online humanitarian crisis, recruitment, radicalization, islamist groups, militancy, terrorism, extremism
    37 Aid and Conflict in Pakistan International Crisis Group (ICG) International, particularly U.S., military and civilian aid has failed to improve Pakistan’s performance against jihadi groups operating on its soil or to help stabilise its nascent democracy. Lopsided focus on security aid after the 11 September 2001 attacks has not delivered counter-terrorism dividends, but entrenched the military’s control over state institutions and policy, delaying reforms and aggravating Pakistani public perceptions that the U.S. is only interested in investing in a security client. Almost two-thirds of U.S. funding since 2002 ($15.8 billion) has been security-related, double the $7.8 billion of economic aid. Under an elected government, and with civilian aid levels at their highest in decades, the U.S. and other donors can still play a major part in improving service delivery, supporting key reforms and strengthening a fragile political transition vital to internal and regional stability. Re-orientation of funding from military security purposes to long-term democracy and capacity building support is the best way to guarantee the West’s and Pakistan’s long-term interests in a dangerous region. But aid policies must be better targeted, designed and executed. Historically, Pakistan’s aid experience has been characterised by steep increases and sudden cut-offs around specific geo-strategic events, such as the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan during the 1980s. That experience still informs Pakistani perceptions of U.S. assistance. As the end of 2014 deadline for the withdrawal of combat forces from Afghanistan approaches, U.S. relations with the military are at an all-time low because of Afghan safe havens in Pakistan’s tribal borderlands, as well as the closure of the NATO pipeline after the November 2011 attack on a Pakistani border post in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Many Pakistani stakeholders fear that the U.S. – responding to the military’s actions and policies – will again abandon its partnership with the people, and the civilian aid pipeline will be cut off. These concerns come less than three years after the U.S. Congress passed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act in October 2009, authorising a tripling of civilian assistance to $7.5 billion over five years. The bill’s underlying goal, supported by the Obama administration, was to broaden engagement beyond a narrow relationship with the military in order to support civilian institutions and democracy. But Islamabad and Washington will have to overcome the policy divide that has defined their relationship particularly since the 2 May 2011 U.S. raid that led to the killing of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. The goal to provide $1.5 billion annually for five years has fallen short by $414 million in fiscal year (FY) 2011 and an estimated $500 million in FY2012. Instead of scaling up its operations in Pakistan, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is trying to reduce expectations, programs and projects. As relations deteriorate, the Pakistani military, with the civilian bureaucracy’s support, has intensified oversight of and interference in aid delivery. Implementing partners, particularly international NGOs, face constant harassment, threats of closure and visa delays and refusals for staff. This has severely impacted all aspects of their operations, from hiring to program implementation. Strained bilateral relations have hampered aid delivery even in areas outside the military’s control. Most prominently, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N)-led Punjab government has refused to accept U.S. assis-tance, suspending government-to-government programs in Pakistan’s largest province. Evolving security threats, in particular kidnappings-for-ransom, have further hampered activities and staff movements, compelling some international organisations to recall staff and scale down and in some cases close operations. In the most prominent case, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), after the beheading of a kidnapped expatriate worker in Balochistan’s provincial capital, Quetta, closed offices in Peshawar, Quetta and Karachi. The space for USAID and the international NGOs (IN-GOs) and Pakistani NGOs it funds is also shrinking as a result of the Obama administration’s aid policy. These organisations have limited input into program designs and strategies, and their work is constrained by an abundance of rules, regulations and reporting requirements. The decision to channel significantly more funding through Pakistani government institutions is understandable, since building the state’s capacity to deliver is vital to democratic transition. So, too, is the effort to go directly to local NGOs. However, the U.S. must partner with a broader range of NGOs that have proven, credible records but lack a presence in Islamabad or the provincial capitals. The U.S. should also consider extending successful INGO-led programs. Maintaining a balance and finding ways to utilise INGO expertise is vital to fill in gaps in local capacity and would also be useful in helping train and support local government and non-governmental organisations with limited capacity. As that capacity develops, INGOs should be incrementally phased out and their projects turned over to government institutions and local NGOs. The U.S. administration’s focus on large, “signature” infrastructure projects as the top priority of its civilian assistance program has similarly limited USAID’s options. The policy is based less on development goals than a bid to win over the Pakistani public through projects that have high visibility and leave an enduring legacy. It depends, however, on a sluggish bureaucracy characterised by opaque, dysfunctional public procurement processes, official corruption and lack of accountability. As a result, appropriated funds get stuck in the pipeline, with USAID consequently coming under intense pressure from Congress to disburse large, unspent funds elsewhere, which risks greater waste. While Pakistan desperately needs water, electricity, roads and telecommunications, projects have to be well designed and should be balanced with support for democratic strengthening, capacity building, public education and civilian law enforcement. Since building state capacity is vital to the democratic transition, the U.S. and other international partners should not reduce their measures of impact to a bricks and mortars game, but instead focus on improving the state’s ability to deliver not just more but better quality services. In formulating policy with major ramifications for aid delivery, they should also consult key stakeholders, including local civil society organisations and Pakistani and international NGOs with a solid track record, as well as the national and provincial legislatures. Congress has rightly expressed strong disapproval of some of the Pakistan military’s actions. It has placed conditions on security-related assistance in existing and proposed legislation, requiring the secretary of state’s certification that the military does not subvert political and judicial processes, has ceased support to extremist groups and brings personnel responsible for human rights violations to account. Unfortunately, the administration has yet to apply such conditions rigorously. Its ability to rubber-stamp certifications in the future may, however, be limited given increasing Congressional scrutiny. It would be well served to follow the legislature’s lead by rigorously applying restrictions on military aid. Rather than throwing good money after bad in an attempt to cajole an unreliable partner into cooperating, it should shift the focus of its counter-terrorism strategy to civilian law enforcement agencies, which could deliver significant results if properly authorised and equipped by the civilian government. For its part, Congress should not allow frustrations with the Pakistani military to affect either civilian assistance or more general engagement with the elected government and representative institutions. It should realise that willingness to spend money on Pakistan on the one hand but a reluctance to explore creative alternatives to existing programs on the other sends confused signals to the Pakistani as well as American publics. It also limits results. Civilian aid levels are still high, despite bilateral tensions, but if programming is guided by short-term security goals, the intended beneficiaries are likely to view the U.S. as at best oblivious and at worst hostile to their needs. Strengthening democratic institutions should not be seen solely as a political goal, but also as the means to stabilise a fragile country, addressing development priorities and shoring up peace in a conflict-prone region. International Crisis Group (ICG) 27-06-12 Read online international aid, US aid, conflict, terrorism, extremism, militancy
    38 Islamic Parties in Pakistan International Crisis Group (ICG) The ability of Pakistan’s radical Islamic parties to mount limited but potentially violent opposition to the government has made democratic reform, and by extension the reduction of religious extremism and development of a more peace­ful and stable society, more challenging. This is a reflection of those parties’ well-organised activist base, which is committed to a narrow partisan agenda and willing to defend it through violence. While their electoral support remains limited, earlier Islamisation programs have given them a strong legal and political apparatus that enables them to influence policy far beyond their numerical strength. An analysis of party agendas and organisation, as well as other sources of influence in judicial, political and civil society institutions, is therefore vital to assessing how Pakistan’s main religious parties apply pressure on government, as well as the ability and willingness of the mainstream parties that are moderate on religious issues to resist that pressure. These parties’ ability to demonstrate support for their various agendas is an expression of coherent internal structures, policymaking processes and relations between the leadership and the rank-and-file. These aspects of party functioning are, therefore, as critical to understanding their role in the polity and prospects of influencing policy in the future as in understanding their relationship to the state. The Islamic parties that are the subject of this report might operate within the current political order, but their ultimate aim is to replace it with one that is based on narrow, discriminatory interpretations of Islam. They have also taken equivocal positions on militant jihad: on the one hand, they insist on their distinction from militant outfits by virtue of working peacefully and within the democratic system; on the other, they admit to sharing the ideological goal of enforcing Sharia (Islamic law), while maintaining sizeable mad­rasa and mosque networks that are breeding grounds for many extremist groups. Moreover, belying their claims of working peacefully, the major Islamic parties maintain militant wings, violent student organisations and ties to extremist groups, and have proved more than willing to achieve political objectives through force. After parlaying military support during the 1980s into significant political and legislative gains, and even absent military support and the electoral assistance that entailed, the parties have still been able to defend earlier gains through intimidation and violent agitation on the streets. In response, faced with their opposition, the mainstream moderate parties have often abandoned promised reforms while in government, or even made further concessions, such as the National Assembly’s constitutional amend­ment in 1974 declaring the Ahmadi sect non-Muslim. Such compromises have not offset the pressure of the ulama (religious scholars), as intended, but only emboldened religious hardliners. The success of the six-party Islamic coalition, Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), in the 2002 elections in Northwest Frontier Province and Balochistan was initially perceived to be testament to the Islamic parties’ power if they were unified in a single bloc. This result, however, was in fact due to massively rigged polls by the military regime of General Pervez Musharraf, which sought to sideline its main opposition, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). Furthermore, the alliance, as reflected in its subsequent breakup, arguably revealed more about internal differences between the parties – particularly between the two largest and most influential, the revivalist Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and the orthodox Deobandi Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI) – than about their unity. Deprived of the military’s support in the 2008 polls, the MMA was routed by the PPP, PML-N and Pashtun nationalist Awami National Party (ANP). Although the Islamic parties support the enforcement of Sharia, they represent different schools of thought, and their resulting acrimonious relations have resulted in intra-religious violence and created splinter factions that have weakened the original party or, in some cases, made it defunct. This has also diminished the likelihood of a restored alliance in the next general election. Nevertheless, the Fazlur Rehman-led faction of the JUI (JUI-F), the JI and smaller Islamic parties remain relevant due to their relative internal coherence; a committed hardcore base, including youth recruited through madrasas and, particularly in the JI’s case, university campuses; and the ability to leverage state institutions. Their prospects for access to meaningful political power, however, still depend on military patronage. Should an ambitious high command decide to disrupt the current democratic dispensation, as in the past, it would likely rely on the Islamic parties to counter the mainstream moderate opposition. In a sustained democratic transition, however, the ability of these parties to influence the polity will depend on the effectiveness of the mainstream moderate parties to consolidate civilian rule and mobilise support for political and legal reform. Discriminatory religious provisions and judicial and political structures such as the Federal Shariat Court and the Council of Islamic Ideology remain on the books and in frequent use. In the current climate, if the government is to fulfil earlier pledges to repeal discriminatory legislation, the mainstream parties, particularly the PPP and PML-N, will have to exploit their far greater and moderate popular base and create consensus on restoring and defending fundamental rights and equality for all citizens. Their success in rallying nationwide mass support against the Musharraf regime in 2007, ultimately effecting its ouster, demonstrates their capacity to do so. Building on the gains they have made with the return to civilian rule, both major parties should, adopt a policy of zero tolerance toward all forms of religious intolerance and extremism as a fundamental element of their efforts to stabilise a still fragile transition the success of which is vital to the country’s stability. But it will require far more active engagement with party activists and grassroots organisations to implement that policy. International Crisis Group (ICG) 12-12-11 Read online extremism, religion, islamism, terrorism, religious movements, militancy, islamist parties
    39 Pakistan: The Worsening IDP Crisis International Crisis Group (ICG) The monsoon floods in Pakistan have caused massive destruction and turned a displacement crisis in the insecure western borderlands into a national disaster of mammoth proportions. When the floods hit, almost all those displaced from Malakand had returned home and were struggling to rebuild lives in a region where much of the infrastructure had been destroyed in fighting; 1.4 million more displaced from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) were living in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province. The disaster would have proved challenging under any circumstance. The fragile civilian government, already tackling an insurgency, and its institutions, neglected during nine years of military rule, lack the capacity and the means to provide sufficient food, shelter, health and sanitation without international assistance. The Pakistan government and international actors should ensure those in the flood-devastated conflict zones are urgently granted the assistance they need to survive and to rebuild lives and livelihoods. If military objectives dictate rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts, a population exhausted by conflict could become a soft target for militants, making stability in the northwest even more elusive. In July 2009, the Pakistani military initiated the return of an estimated 2.8 million people displaced by militancy and military operations in the Malakand region of KPK. Named Niwa- e-Seher (new dawn), this return process supposedly affirmed the military’s success against militant networks in Swat and other parts of the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). The same principle is being replicated in FATA where some 1.4 million people have been displaced by militancy and military operations. The humanitarian crisis in FATA has received significantly less attention than displacement from KPK’s Mala­kand region. Many have been unable to register or receive assistance due to the military’s tight control over access to humanitarian agencies in KPK’s Internally Displaced Person (IDP) hosting areas and continued security threats. In parts of FATA, most notably Bajaur agency, families have been forced to flee repeatedly because of a militant resurgence. Yet relying on the pace of returns as an indicator of success in anti-Taliban operations, the military has largely determined the humanitarian agenda, with scant objection from the international community. With the militants once again escalating their campaign of violence in the tribal belt, FATA’s IDPs must not be compelled to return home before the threats to their safety subside. Deprived of resources, fiscal and human, during more than nine years of military rule, Pakistan’s civilian administrative and humanitarian apparatus is now severely tested by the worst flooding in the country’s history. One fifth of the country and more than 20 million people have been affected. Some of the worst damage is in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where the largest numbers of lives have been lost and where homes, schools, hospitals, agriculture, factories and the communication infrastructure are devastated, and crops and livestock lost. The state’s response has been slow as a result of multiple factors – ill-equipped and under-resourced state relief organs, the absence of civil-military coordination and ineffective civilian control over military-led efforts. This inadequate response has angered and alienated hundreds of thousands of returnees, making them vulnerable to jihadi propaganda and recruitment. International assistance has begun to pour in but on a scale that is still far too modest to meet the enormous needs of urgent relief. In the months ahead, civilian-led mechanisms, which include the involvement of affected communities, credible secular NGOs, professional organisations and the provincial and national parliaments, will be crucial if the massive challenges of rehabilitation and reconstruction are to be effectively tackled. Prior to the floods, the humanitarian community had prepared the draft of a major policy document, the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA), to identify development needs, propose political reforms in Malakand and FATA, and devise a strategy for their implementation. As this document is being rewritten to reflect the challenges posed by the floods, any post-conflict plan must reaffirm civilian supremacy and recommend PATA and FATA’s integration into the constitutional, political and legal mainstream. The impact of the floods on Malakand’s returnees or on FATA’s IDPs is not yet clear, but as relief again becomes a top priority, all assistance, local and international, must be delinked from the military’s institutional interests and directives, even granting the importance of the military’s logistics capabilities during rescue and emergency relief operations. The civilian government and donors should also seize this opportunity to ensure that rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts meet the needs of their intended beneficiaries, and bolster civilian institutional capacity and authority at the same time. International Crisis Group (ICG) 16-09-10 Read online humanitarian crisis, internally displaced persons (IDPs), recruitment, radicalization, islamist groups, militancy, terrorism, extremism
    40 Religion as the Foundation of a Nation: The Making and Unmaking of Pakistan P. K. Upadhyay Pakistan owes its origin to the ‘Two Nation Theory’ in the sub-continent’s polity. Leaders of the Pakistan Movement were convinced that Muslims were a separate nation from the Hindu nation and the two could not live together. In their zeal to create a modern progressive Muslim state in the sub-continent they chose to down-ply, or even ignore, the sectarian divide that had been manifesting in South Asian Islam even when the British were still at the helms. Came independence and these sectarian fault-lines began to manifest themselves in Pakistan’s polity. It would be erroneous to blame General Zia ul-Haq with triggering the big Islamic theological divides, they were already there. Even General Ayub Khan and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto tried to politically manipulate the sectarian divide in Pakistan to suit their needs. What Zia ul-Haq did was to build a common cause with Islamic zealots and provide them Army/ISI’s patronage and access within the structures of the government. Various national and regional events since then have allowed these Radical Islamists (RIs) become almost a state within the state. Which way this sectarian divide going to turn? Would Pakistan as came into existence in 1947 going to survive? What is going to be the future shape and structures Pakistan is likely to acquire under the Radical Islamist’s (RIs) onslaught? These are some of the questions this monograph seeks to examine and hopes to trigger a debate on ways to assess and deal with the impending catastrophe in Pakistan which is likely to be cataclysmic by any yard stick. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) 01-05-14 Read online history, religion, islamism, terrorism, democracy
    41 Domination of Pakistan by Radical Islamists P. K. Upadhyay The Pakistani Radical Islamists (RIs) seem to have been the actual winners in the recently concluded Pakistan elections. The RIs, comprising the Pashtuns belonging to the Tehriq-e-Taliban Pakistan, their Punjabi and Pakistan based Kashmiri cohorts belonging to a big chunk of the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and the Jamaat-ud Daw’ah, almost the entire Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, the Jaish-e-Mohammad and a number of other radical Islamic militant groups, swear allegiance to Deobandi/Wahabi/Salafi schools of Islam. They also identify with Al-Qaida’s radical Islamic philosophy of a global Islamic order through jihad. A recent illustration by Pakistani cartoonist, Sabir Nazar, on www.pakvotes.pk, succinctly sums up the ascendancy of the RIs in Pakistan’s current political discourse. The cartoon, while portraying “Old Pakistan” shows a Taliban gunman putting his AK-47 on the head of a Pakistani politician of ANP/PPP variety, who is standing somewhat bewildered but firm. The ‘New Pakistan’ is portrayed by the same Taliban with a grin on his face and his gun slung on the shoulder, as a politician, looking like Imran Khan, kneels down at his feet. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) 14-06-13 Read online islamism, terrorism, democracy, 2013 elections
    42 Pakistan’s Military-Militant Cabal Rajeev Sharma Pakistan has for long been running with the hares and hunting with the hounds. While it has been a key partner of the international community in the war against terror, elements in Pakistani military establishment have been hand in glove with the very same terror outfits they are supposed to fight. This paper seeks to put a laser focus on the Janus-faced Pakistan and discuss Pakistan’s duplicitous conduct in dealing with the jihadists. A prime example of the Pakistani strategy in dealing with terror outfits is the Haqqani network which has been discussed in depth here. This paper also takes into account the recent tensions between the United States and Pakistan on the terror issue. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) 01-10-11 Read online military, militancy, terrorism, extremism, insurgency
    43 Sectarian Strife in Gilgit Baltistan Priyanka Singh Gilgit Baltistan, a part of Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK), has been in the grip of another bout of violence and unrest for the last three months. February 2012 witnessed the blatant killing of Shia pilgrims in Kohistan on the Karakoram Highway when they were returning from Iran. In the aftermath of this particular incident, a series of clashes have taken place in the region, the most grievous among them being the massacre of Shias at Chilas on April 3, 2012. The spate of killings has unleashed fear and uncertainty among the people and there is an open outcry about the government’s inaction and inability to control the situation. And it has also once again stirred sectarian sentiments, heightening tensions not only between the rival sects but among the public at large. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) 21-05-12 Read online sectarianism, governance, islamism, radicalization, sectarian conflict
    44 Beginning of the Countdown to Sectarian End-Game in Pakistan? P. K. Upadhyay Kayani’s comments on Siachen and other recent Pakistani overtures being made to India on trade and other issues need to be seen in their correct perspective: against the backdrop of the ever worsening sectarian divide in Pakistan, the ever widening chasm in relations between the Pakistani establishment and the Taliban and other Deobandi Islamic zealots on both sides of the Durand Line, the ever increasing economic crunch facing Pakistan, particularly the Army, due to stoppage of US and other international assistance, and the continuing failure of the economy to sustain the ever mounting military expenditure. It is a moot point whether if the Afghan Taliban and their associates come to power in Kabul by overthrowing the Karzai regime, they would remain loyal to the Pakistani establishment or gravitate towards supporting the struggle of their coreligionist TTP and its Punjabi associates against the Barelvi dominated Pakistani state. The Pakistani leadership has apparently come to the point where it realises that for the survival of the country and its structures created by Jinnah, it must buy peace for the present with its arch-enemy India. In their minds a tactical move to mend fences with India would allow them to divert military resources from the eastern to the western borders where the uncertain Afghan situation might be becoming critical. India should not bale Pakistan out without the latter making an effort to extricate itself from its present predicament by making tough choices and taking hard action. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) 27-04-12 Read online sectarianism, terrorism, islamism, radicalization, sectarian conflict
    45 European Union aid to Pakistan: steadily on the rise Anis Cassar An increase in violence between Islamic extremists and the Pakistani government over the last 12 months has given rise to a destabilising humanitarian crisis. The European Union is alarmed at the potential impact of these problems - coupled with a decline in social and economic development - on international efforts to end the insurgency in neighbouring Afghanistan as well as on regional stability. In a break from its traditionally minimalist involvement in Pakistan with respect to both humanitarian and development aid, in 2009 the EU pledged €485 million in assistance over the next 5 years, with Member States committing a further €800 million, with an injection this year of an estimated €71 million into emergency and other humanitarian projects and programmes. Development assistance constitutes 70% of total EC aid to the country, attributable largely to the fact that European states have traditionally been more significant players in Pakistan with respect to development assistance as opposed to humanitarian aid. However it appears likely that the realisation, over the next few years, of numerous humanitarian commitments made by the EC in the past will act to decrease this proportion. While it is clear that EU humanitarian aid to Pakistan is steadily on the rise, this latest ISS analysis argues that it is not and certainly should not be at the expense of development assistance. And given the alarming increase in extremist violence, it is suggested that both types of aid need to be maintained in the long-term in order to prevent the socio-political collapse of Pakistan. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) 07-12-09 Read online war on terror, EU, counterterrorism, EU aid, democracy, terrorism
    46 Pakistan: the end of exceptionalism? Samina Ahmed, Muhammad Amir Rana, Gilles Boquérat, Stephen P. Cohen, Ijaz Shafi Gilani, Maleeha Lodhi, Polly Nayak Pakistan is often approached by external analysts as a unique and challenging security problem which poses serious threats to the international community. The Pakistani people also tend to believe, if for different reasons, in their country’s exceptionalism. The consolidation of democracy will be made more difficult under these circumstances, since the consolidation process inevitably entails a ‘normalisation’ of political and institutional life. Exceptionalist approaches tend to be self-perpetuating, without giving the population a chance to build on their own strengths. Domestic and international actors who have influence over Pakistan should be aware that democratic consolidation will be difficult in a climate of general distrust. International support, in particular, should proceed with the goal of moderating catastrophic perceptions of domestic tensions and external threats which can lead to extraordinary measures and excessive responses adopted as a result of such perceptions. This does not mean, of course, that the challenges Pakistan is facing should be underestimated. Even if democracy is consolidating, tensions among constitutional institutions and powers are acute and will remain so for some time to come. Prime Minister Gilani has been forced to resign by the Supreme Court and his successor has been ordered to proceed with a corruption investigation against President Zardari. Considering how important the judiciary, led by the current Supreme Court Justice, was in helping bring an end to the Musharraf regime, there is hope that the current tussle does not represent a threat to the democratic regime as well. In the past, judicial activism of this kind was likely to be traced back to the most powerful political actors in the country: the military. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) 22-10-12 Read online democracy, extremism, terrorism, militancy
    47 Coping with a failing Pakistan Stephen P. Cohen As a state and a nation Pakistan has been in trouble for many years, but both now seem to be in a downward spiral. As a recent Brookings study observed, it is very difficult to predict Pakistan’s short-term future, or the impact on its neighbours, let alone the wider international community. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, its history of irresponsible behaviour as a nuclear proliferator, the close ties between radical Islamists and Pakistan, and its continuing hostile relations with India and Afghanistan all complicate efforts to look ahead even five years, let alone to speculate about effective policies. The present policy of focusing on internal stability while encouraging Pakistani cooperation on Afghanistan and good relations with India is probably optimal, although it is unlikely alone to bring about Pakistan’s domestic transformation. These policies will not succeed unless Pakistanis, notably in the army, soon come to terms with their decaying state, rising radicalism, feeble economy and a waning spirit of national identity. Outsiders can point out the dangers and provide economic and even military assistance that will help on the margins, but the battle for Pakistan will be won – or lost – by Pakistanis themselves. Some proposed policies are irresponsible and others are self-defeating or impractical. Yet, a crisis precipitated by Pakistani behaviour, notably a terrorist attack that originated in Pakistan – whether it was deliberate or not, may force more proactive policies. Chief among these would be increased pressure on Pakistan, or even a containment strategy. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) 22-02-11 Read online separatism, sectarianism, governance, islamism
    48 The impact of the Islamic State on Pakistan Muhammad Amir Rana The growing influence of the terrorist group known as the Islamic State (IS) is a worrisome prospect for Pakistan. It appears that the militant landscape of the country will become more complex and threatening after the emergence of the Baghdadi-led IS in Iraq and Syria. Because Pakistani militants do not operate in isolation, it is natural for them to draw inspiration from the IS. As militant groups prepare to enter into another phase of ideologically and operationally transformed jihadist discourse, the implications for Pakistan’s internal security are severe. Apart from security implications, this process will affect extremism discourse in the country and the behaviour of non-violent religious organisations. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) 07-01-15 Read online ISIS, militancy, extremism, terrorism, islamism, radicalization
    49 Creating an environment that counteracts militant ideologies and radicalism in Pakistan Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) A growing realisation among various states that counter-terrorism efforts to kill and capture militants will not in themselves suffice to check the militant onslaught has prompted them to evolve “soft” approaches and strategies to win the hearts and minds of the people and eliminate hatred, intolerance and extreme interpretations of religion. Such soft approaches are at the heart of various counter-radicalisation and deradicalisation programmes that are being implemented in various Muslim-majority and other countries. The Egyptian, Yemeni, Jordanian and Indonesian models essentially developed as ideological responses to terrorism and extremism, while the Saudi model emphasised rehabilitation through psychological and social modules, along with ideological responses. Most of these programmes are based on the assumption that religious extremism is a matter of ideology originating from a (mis)interpretation of religion that leads to deviant social and psychological behaviours, and there is sufficient evidence available to indicate that this assumption is valid for Pakistan. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) 19-03-14 Read online militancy, terrorism, extremism, radicalism, ideology
    50 Extremism and violence in Pakistan: durability and instability Riazat Butt Religiously motivated extremism and violence have destabilised Pakistan since its inception. The state neither prevents assassinations and massacres nor acts to defuse their impact. In public, the conversations about religion and violence veer towards the extreme. Much of the present landscape has its roots in the past. The state-sanctioned use of several militant groups to fight proxy wars, the continuous framing of threats against Islam as threats against Pakistan, and the media reinforcing divisions along sectarian lines go some way to explaining attitudes towards religiously motivated violence and its enduring grip on Pakistan. In recent years foreign interventions, in the form of U.S. drone strikes, have exacerbated the situation and politicians find themselves addressing militants as if they were equals. Resolving religiously motivated extremism and violence is a priority for Pakistan, yet the state is unable to act. Ultimately the onus lies on citizens to reject religiously motivated extremism and violence and prioritise domestic security. Given the failure of Pakistan to act in the interests of the people, the people must act in the interests of Pakistan. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) 05-02-14 Read online militancy, terrorism, extremism, radicalism, instability
    51 The Baluch insurgency: linking Iran to Pakistan Zia Ur Rehman The Sistan and Baluchistan Province of Iran has long been associated with instability and armed conflict. The two million largely Sunni Muslim Baluch living in the province have suffered sustained racist persecution and discrimination in predominantly Shia and Persian-speaking Iran. Analysts claim that lack of development and cultural and religious repression in Sistan and Baluchistan have encouraged popular support for the insurgency among the Baluch community. Iran claims that the main bases of the two main Baluch insurgents groups, Jundullah and Jaish-ul Adl, are in Pakistan's Baluchistan Province, which shares a 1,165-kilometre border with Iran. Iranian forces are increasingly carrying out cross-border attacks against these groups, straining relations between Iran and Pakistan and possibly fuelling sectarian violence in both countries. Pakistan is battling its own Baluch separatist insurgency. It is feared that the mistreatment of the Baluch community on both sides of the border could lead to an alliance between religiously motivated anti-Iranian Sunni militant groups and the various secular Pakistani Baluch separatist groups. Iranian Baluch militants groups are not only causing an increasing internal security crisis in Iran, but are also threatening to become the key to the survival of the Taliban on the Iran-Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) 02-06-14 Read online balochistan, iran separatist movement, militancy, insurgency
    52 The 2014 ISAF pullout from Afghanistan: impacts on Pakistan Safiya Aftab Pakistan’s internal dynamics are likely to be affected by the situation in Afghanistan after 2014, because the latter’s continuing unrest has affected security and the economy in Pakistan for some decades. If unrest continues in Afghanistan or the country is plunged into civil war, the activities of Pakistani militant groups, including the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and its affiliates, are likely to gain in intensity. Unlike in the 1990s, the possibility of a civil war spilling over into Pakistan cannot be precluded. The civilian administration is likely to all but withdraw from the restive border region, which will likely serve as a base for key warring factions to regroup, rearm and withdraw to if necessary. The authority of the state will continue to erode in other parts of the country. The situation in Balochistan could become extremely fragile if nationalist elements decide to take advantage of the chaos to garner external support for their struggle. Pakistan’s indigenous crime networks, many of which are now linked to militant groups, are likely to benefit from increased insecurity. Pakistan may also be burdened with the influx of refugees. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) 12-12-13 Read online afghanistan, pullout, war against terror, terrorism, counterterrorism
    53 Pakistan’s role and strategic priorities in Afghanistan since 1980 Safdar Sial Pakistan’s Afghan policy in 1980s and 1990s largely remained focused on seeking strategic depth in Afghanistan and countering the traditional Afghanistan-India alliance, which had been creating trouble for Pakistan by supporting the Balochi insurgents and promoting the idea of a greater Pashtunistan. It gradually developed a progressive and broader outlook during the post-9/11 environment and the subsequent “war on terror” without Pakistan’s making any compromise on its legitimate interests in Afghanistan. Currently Pakistan is struggling to build confidence and establish good relations with Afghanistan. Apart from ensuring a peaceful, stable and non-hostile Afghanistan, which is imperative for and directly linked to Pakistan’s internal security, such efforts also form part of Pakistan’s emerging foreign policy outlook, which largely builds on its economic and energy needs and internal pressures to counter extremist and militant threats. Pakistan’s inaction against the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqanis could also be partly explained in terms of its internal security and capacity rather than the strategic depth doctrine. Pakistan wants to support an Afghan-led process of political reconciliation, but there are visible differences among stakeholders regarding talks with the Taliban. Failure to develop and implement a coherent policy and methodology for reconciliation in Afghanistan could have grim consequences for the security and stability of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the wider region. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) 11-06-13 Read online afghanistan, al-Qaeda, taliban, war against terror, terrorism, counterterrorism
    54 The evolving role of women in Pakistani politics Huma Yusuf In Pakistan’s upcoming general elections on March 11th 2013 only 36 women are contesting general National Assembly seats on political party tickets, up from 34 in the 2008 elections. This low number contradicts overall trends whereby a growing number of women are contesting elections as independent candidates and more women are registered to vote than ever before. Despite these indicators, Pakistan’s political parties have done little in this election cycle to facilitate women’s participation in the political process. This is owing to fears of low female voter turnout and the consequence of local government systems that have prevented political parties from cultivating female candidates at the grass-roots level. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) 08-05-13 Read online women, extremism, governance, politics
    55 Poverty and radicalisation into violent extremism: a causal link? Atle Mesøy The consensus in past research into terrorism and radicalisation into violent extremism (RVE) is that generally there is no link between poverty and radicalisation, and if such a link exists, it is a weak one. However, insufficient attention has been paid to how terrorism has changed over the last few years to become a phenomenon that frequently occurs in weak, conflict-ridden states. In these states, poverty seems to play an essential role especially with regard to the motivation of suicide bombers. In the case of Pakistan, a current hotbed of terrorism, little research has been done on this issue and what little research that has been conducted points in opposite directions. However, more recent research has concluded that RVE and terrorism have to be researched in each country/area where terrorism exists and conclusions cannot be generalised to all countries. There is reason to believe that there is a causal link between poverty and RVE, especially in countries such as Pakistan, where there are high levels of poverty and militant groups both recruit and supply social services, and where poverty-stricken young men have few livelihood options other than that of joining a militant group. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) 23-01-13 Read online poverty, radicalization, militancy, extremism, economy
    56 The threat of growing extremism in Punjab David Hansen During the last few years Punjab has experienced a deep social crisis in which Islamist organisations have been able to challenge the Pakistani authorities’ power – as certain Islamist organisations, including extremist ones, increasingly are filling the role of welfare providers to the people. Punjab is experiencing a shift from the traditional Barelvi (Sufi) Islam towards more orthodox interpretations of the faith – often in quite radical variants. Some of the most important extremist Islamist organisations instrumental in this reorientation have become involved in criminal activity and in settling scores between competing bodies at the local level. Local judiciary, police and politicians often function as enablers for the extremists. This is not only troublesome for Pakistan: rising radical Islamist tendencies can be witnessed in Norway among certain Norwegian-Pakistanis. This policy brief describes some initial findings regarding the potential consequences of Punjab’s social crisis, its patterns of extremism and the reorientation of religion in the province. It argues that in addition to being problematic for Pakistan, this development may have an adverse effect on diaspora communities living in the West. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) 17-12-12 Read online extremism, militancy, Punjab, radicalization
    57 Crucial reform of Pakistan’s blasphemy laws remains a distant dream Sana Majeed McMillion Pakistan’s blasphemy laws have been at the centre of a fierce debate, especially after the assassination of the Punjab governor, Salman Taseer, in 2011. Pakistani society has been exposed to a potent and toxic mix of religious nationalism since the 1980s and consequently is divided along ideological fault lines that exacerbate the existing economic disparities. The media are also fragmented, catering only to their particular niches. This report takes a closer look at the role of the news media in the debate about blasphemy law reform in the aftermath of Taseer’s assassination, and attempts to assess public sentiment regarding this debate. Key findings of the media analysis indicate that the media reflect the fragmentation of Pakistani society, and that, while key issues such as the steady rise of extremism in the country and the ruling and military elite’s support for religious nationalism were identified by some newspapers, the debate over blasphemy law reform was lost in competing narratives. To assess public sentiment regarding the debate on the assassination and blasphemy law reform, surveys were carried out among students at two universities in Lahore to test the hypothesis that the upper-middle class and the rich are comparatively liberal and progressive in their political and religious thinking compared to the middle or lower-middle classes. This hypothesis was partially verified in terms of the data gathered. More than a year after Taseer’s assassination, Pakistan remains deeply divided and the muchneeded reform of the blasphemy laws remains sidelined, but if civil society and the media play a constructive role, there is hope to at least start the reform process. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) 12-10-12 Read online blasphemy, minorities, extremism, legislation, islamism
    58 Social media in Pakistan: catalyst for communication, not change Michael Kugelman This report surveys social media in Pakistan. It identifies five ways in which Pakistan’s social media act as communication tools: they break or give greater attention to stories ignored by traditional media; they play a mobilisation role by disseminating information about protests and other social campaigns; they promote humanitarian efforts by co-ordinating and advertising initiatives; they serve as advocates for social causes; and they stimulate communication between politicians and their constituents. The report discusses why social media tools in Pakistan cannot presently produce large-scale change. One reason is that Pakistan’s traditional media outlets already serve as change agents and co-opt social media’s ability to serve this role. A more fundamental reason is a low penetration rate. The risks posed by social media in Pakistan include their succumbing to the same ideological divisions that afflict Pakistani society and even becoming a haven for extremist online communication. Another risk is that the lack of regulation will produce unethical content. Europe can help mitigate these risks by sponsoring projects that develop guidelines for appropriate content and by supporting initiatives that promote tolerant online communication. Donors can also assist by strengthening technical capacity (through funding broadband Internet expansion efforts) and sponsoring research on social media. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) 15-08-12 Read online social media, extremism, social change
    59 Sectarian violence: Pakistan’s greatest security threat? Huma Yusuf Pakistan is experiencing a sharp resurgence in sectarian violence. Most frequently, such violence involves clashes between members of the two main sects of Islam – Sunnis and Shias – but violent incidents between the Barelvi and Deobandi sub-sects of Sunni Islam are also on the rise. The heightened frequency and brutality of Sunni-Shia clashes threaten national security – Pakistan’s is the second-largest Shia population in the world after Iran – as well as bilateral relations with Iran and the regional power dynamic vis-à-vis Saudi Arabian influence. The current resurgence of sectarian violence can be traced to the rise of the Pakistani Taliban in the mid-2000s and this organisation’s growing ties with militant sectarian organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi; as such, sectarian violence is arguably the most dangerous fallout for Pakistan of the U.S.-led war against terrorism in neighbouring Afghanistan. Sectarian violence has spread across the country and is increasingly directed at disenfranchised targets such as Balochistan’s Hazaras (an ethnic minority) and worshippers at Sufi shrines. The government’s continuing failure to dismantle militant groups, enforce bans on hate speech and sectarian propaganda, improve the criminal justice system, and reform the madrassas has allowed sectarianism to thrive. In the absence of a comprehensive state crackdown, sectarian violence threatens to worsen Pakistan’s fragile security situation. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) 09-08-12 Read online sectarian violence, security, instability, terrorism, extremism
    60 Exclusion: a hidden driver of Pakistan’s fragility Clare Castillejo Deeply entrenched patterns of political, social and economic exclusion are fuelling Pakistan’s fragility. Large segments of the population are denied basic rights, access to resources, or a political voice based on their identity or location. This creates grievances that motivate people to violence. It also perpetuates Pakistan’s elite and unaccountable governance, which itself is a major cause of instability. There are four main axes of exclusion that most clearly drive Pakistan’s fragility. These are the political and economic exclusion of some regions by the political centre; the exclusion from access to land experienced by much of the rural population; the profound exclusion and violence faced by religious minorities; and the exclusion of many young people and women, which contributes to Pakistan’s demographic instability. Ultimately, all these forms of exclusion serve the interests of Pakistan’s civilian, military and traditional elites. Hence there is little political will to challenge them. The international community has so far failed to pay sufficient attention to issues of exclusion and inequality within its response to Pakistan’s fragility. European actors are particularly well placed to address exclusion through their political engagement and development assistance to Pakistan. However, they are likely to face strong resistance from Pakistani elites, as well as other challenges. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) 26-04-12 Read online exclusion, economy, human rights, radicalization, extremism
    61 Taking Stock: Madrasa Reform in Pakistan Kaja Borchgrevink , Kristian Berg Harpviken Searching for the roots of terrorism after the attacks of 9/11, the world’s attention turned to Pakistan and to Pakistan’s religious schools, the “madrasas”. This put pressure on the Pakistani government to reform the madrasas and ignited a long standing debate on the role of religious education in Pakistan and its links to radicalisation and militancy. This policy brief argues that the madrasa debate is not premised on a fair description of reality. The madrasa sector is diverse. The majority of Pakistan’s madrasas are moderate institutions, concerned with promoting Islamic beliefs and knowledge. This makes it important to distinguish between moderate and militant madrasas. Madrasas must be seen as part of an Islamic tradition of learning, not primarily as political groups, but rather as socio-cultural institutions that are revered by many in Pakistan today. The madrasa community has resisted state interference and rejected government control over curriculum in favor of the authority of religious experts. Likewise, madrasas are wary of financial dependence on the government, which is associated with government control. The government’s ambiguous relationship to militant groups is also condemned by madrasas who argue that the government is clamping down on moderate schools, while madrasas known to have links to militant groups are under protection and therefore operate freely. The recent accord signed by the nation-wide Federation of Madrasa Boards and the Minister of Interior in October 2010 is a promising step forward in improving madrasa-government relations. It sets the terms for government-approved madrasa syllabi, for granting religious education boards the same status as other education boards, and prohibits madrasas from teaching or publishing “any literature that promotes militancy or spreads sectarianism”. While there are clearly areas of disagreement, there is an interest within the current madrasa leadership to cooperate with the government, as long as this cooperation does not compromise the madrasas’ independent position. The sector is well organised and operates as a unified group, which potentially could facilitate sector-wide reform. Dealing with the rise in militancy is a huge challenge, which involves a much broader strategy than a narrow focus on madrasas and their reform. Moderate madrasas, if engaged in a process based on respect and dialogue, represent an untapped potential. If encouraged, moderate madrasas could help reduce sectarian conflict and the incidence of violence, and identify and promote solutions leading towards a more peaceful coexistence. A blanket condemnation of madrasas could end up serving as a self-fulfilling prophecy, contributing to the radicalisation of moderate madrasas. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) 06-07-11 Read online madrassah reform, education, religious education, radicalization, extremism, terrorism
    62 Pakistan’s Madrasas: Moderation or Militancy? The madrasa debate and the reform process Kaja Borchgrevink Why have the madrasas become a subject of such controversy? What roles do madrasas play in Pakistani society? What are the main challenges and opportunities for madrasa reform? Since 11 September 2001, Pakistan’s madrasas have received much attention from the media, policy analysts and politicians. The bulk of the literature has asserted strong links between madrasas and militancy. Madrasas have thus become the focus of a much larger debate on Islam and militancy. This security discourse has placed the most radical madrasas in the spotlight and has left out the moderate, non-militant and non-political madrasas. From a broader policy implication perspective, one can more constructively and fruitfully approach the “madrasa challenge” by looking at the diversity of schools existing in this sector, in terms of size, financing, and theological and ideological positions, as well as at their links to political groups. This report presents the core issues in the debate and identifies some of the challenges and opportunities for reform. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) 22-06-11 Read online madrassah reform, education, religious education, radicalization, extremism, terrorism
    63 Pakistan: The Rising Dangers Marco Mezzera The assassination of the governor of Punjab in January 2011, motivated by his support for reform of Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws, shows that religious extremism in Pakistan is still on the rise. In this sense, the killing of a high-ranking politician from the ruling Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) cannot be regarded only as the work of an isolated fanatic. Rather, his extreme gesture is yet another alarming signal of the deep religious and sectarian cleavages that mark Pakistani society. The population finds itself squeezed between a liberal and distant elite on one side, and the religious right on the other – and it is the right’s offering of an egalitarian populism on earth and just rewards in the afterlife that is winning converts. Almost a third of Pakistanis live below the official poverty-line, and it is no surprise that many in this position are receptive to the radical message. Meanwhile, the PPP government has faced defections that threaten its political survival, and has been forced to rescind austerity measures promoted by the IMF, demonstrating that in Pakistan internal power dynamics are more important for political survival than external pressures. The international focus on security has led to the neglect of education and public information by the state. Religious parties have filled this vacuum by moulding the curricula to conform to their ideological positions. If the Pakistani state is unable to restore hope in a decent future for the majority of the population, the country may very well face disintegration along sectarian, ethnic or party lines and ultimately, the intervention of backward-looking military and religious elements. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) 24-01-11 Read online extremism, terrorism, militancy, instability, governance
    64 Pakistan: Dealing with Peace in the Tribal Areas? Laila Bokhari The six Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along Pakistan’s western border have long been seen as a hub for militants, some with sympathies to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The region has increasingly come to the world’s attention as a recruitment and training base for groups responsible for attacks on Pakistani soil and as a launch pad for attacks on US troops and their allies in Afghanistan. Even though the various groups comprising the Pakistani Taliban have been around for a number of years, it was only in December 2007 that they formally established themselves as a united force. Western intelligence services also voice concern about the numbers of their own citizens travelling to the tribal areas for training. Long-term connections between some tribes and the militants is an issue that has become both a headache and an opportunity for the Pakistani authorities. For years, the Pakistani Army has relied on a two-pronged approach to the militants in those areas: sporadic military strikes and negotiations. The authorities have brokered a number of peace agreements with both tribal leaders and members of the Taliban, often with the intention of exploiting local power politics and weakening the militant groups by dividing them. Most such deals, however, have collapsed. Furthermore, the agreements have been criticized because they effectively appear to cede space to the insurgents, rather than minimizing their power. This brief examines the peace deals that the Pakistani authorities have made with militants and tribal leaders and the reasons for their failure. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) 22-11-10 Read online Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), militancy, insurgency, governance, terrorism
    65 Drivers of Long-Term Insecurity and Instability in Pakistan: Urbanization Jonah Blank, Christopher Clary, Brian Nichiporuk Already one of the most urbanized nations in South Asia, Pakistan is projected to have a majority of its population living in cities within three decades. This demographic shift will alter Pakistan's politics and threaten its stability, but the political and security implications of Pakistan's urbanization remain underanalyzed. This report examines urbanization as a potential driver of long-term insecurity and instability, with particular attention to the cities of Karachi, Lahore, and Quetta. Drawing on demographic trends, election results, and survey data, the authors conclude that urbanization may fuel anti-American sentiment and help recruitment by transnational Islamist groups (but not necessarily Islamist political parties) in the short term. Urbanization is also likely to increase popular demand for political reform in Pakistan. In the near future, a Pakistani government more directly accountable to its electorate might be less willing to cooperate with the United States in unpopular security policies. In the long run, however, a Pakistani government more responsive to its citizens could be a better security partner for the United States. By spurring Pakistani policymakers to focus on provision of good governance and public services rather than on scapegoating external actors, political reform may eventually help reduce anti-American attitudes. RAND Corporation 30-10-14 Read online urbanization, migration, militancy, extremism, terrorism, violence
    66 Countering Others' Insurgencies: Understanding U.S. Small-Footprint Interventions in Local Context Stephen Watts, Jason H. Campbell, Patrick B. Johnston, Sameer Lalwani, Sarah H. Bana This study examines the counterinsurgency strategies and practices adopted by threatened regimes and the conditions under which U.S. "small-footprint" partnerships are likely to help these governments succeed. The report's findings are derived from a mixed-method research design incorporating both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Simple statistical analyses are applied to a dataset of counterinsurgencies that have terminated since the end of the Cold War (72 in all), and more in-depth analyses are provided of two recent cases of U.S. partnerships with counterinsurgent regimes, in the Philippines and Pakistan. The quantitative analysis finds that the cases of small-footprint U.S. operations that are commonly touted as "success stories" all occurred in countries approximating a best-case scenario. Such a verdict is not meant to deny the importance of U.S. assistance; rather, it is meant to highlight that similar U.S. policies with less promising partner nations should not be expected to produce anywhere near the same levels of success. The majority of insurgencies have taken place in worst-case conditions, and in these environments, counterinsurgent regimes are typically unsuccessful in their efforts to end rebellion, and they often employ violence indiscriminately. The case studies of the Philippines and Pakistan largely reinforce the findings of the quantitative analysis. They also highlight the challenges the United States faces in attempting to influence partner regimes to fight counterinsurgencies in the manner that the United States would prefer. The study concludes with policy recommendations for managing troubled partnerships. RAND Corporation 25-02-14 Read online counterinsurgency, war on terror, philippines,
    67 India's and Pakistan's Strategies in Afghanistan: Implications for the United States and the Region Larry Hanauer, Peter Chalk India and Pakistan have very different visions for Afghanistan, and they seek to advance highly disparate interests through their respective engagements in the country. Pakistan views Afghanistan primarily as an environment in which to pursue its rivalry with India. India pursues domestic priorities (such as reining in anti-Indian terrorism, accessing Central Asian energy resources, and increasing trade) that require Afghanistan to experience stability and economic growth. Thus, whereas Pakistan seeks to fashion an Afghan state that would detract from regional security, India would enhance Afghanistan's stability, security, economic growth, and regional integration. Afghanistan would welcome greater involvement from India, though it will need to accommodate the interests of multiple other external powers as well. India has a range of options for engaging Afghanistan, from continuing current activities to increasing economic and commercial ties, deploying forces to protect Indian facilities, continuing or expanding training for Afghan forces, or deploying combat troops for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency missions. To avoid antagonizing Pakistan, India is likely to increase economic and commercial engagement while maintaining, or perhaps augmenting, military training, though it will continue to conduct such training inside India. Increased Indian engagement in Afghanistan, particularly enhanced Indian assistance to Afghan security forces, will advance long-term U.S. objectives in central and south Asia. As the United States prepares to withdraw its combat forces from Afghanistan in 2014, it should therefore encourage India to fill the potential vacuum by adopting an increasingly assertive political, economic, and security strategy that includes increased security assistance. RAND Corporation 08-08-12 Read online india, afghanistan, terrorism, war on terror, central asia, regional security
    68 Developing Stability: Community-Driven Development and Reconstruction in Conflict-Affected Settings Brooke Stearns Lawson From drug trafficking in Mexico and Central America, to violent extremism in the Horn of Africa, to insurgents in Colombia, to all three in Afghanistan and Pakistan, significant weaknesses in governance and economic development underlie many of the greatest security threats currently facing the United States. A solely military solution to these issues will not achieve long-term success without efforts to improve the underlying conditions that foster the insecurity in the first place. More specifically, development and reconstruction efforts need to bolster the legitimacy, effectiveness, and reach of the indigenous government, as well as address the population's grievances. Although the international community has widely accepted the importance of addressing the root causes of instability, significant questions remain over whether — and how — actors can feasibly implement these critical activities in insecure environments. Using a comparative case study approach, this dissertation tests the hypothesis that development and reconstruction actors can feasibly implement sound development and reconstruction across a relatively wide spectrum of conflict, but varying levels and natures of violence can affect its delivery. The dissertation develops an analytic framework that defines seven principles of sound development and reconstruction and identifies three aspects of the conflict context — the background; the current social, economic and political factors; and the security environment — that affect these principles RAND Corporation 04-11-11 Read online stability, development, reconstruction, violent conflict, afghanistan, nation building, peacekeeping, economic development
    69 Counterinsurgency in Pakistan Seth G. Jones, C. Christine Fair Since 2001, Pakistan has undertaken a number of operations against militant groups, including al Qa'ida, that directly affect U.S. national security. Despite some successes, militant groups continue to present a significant threat to Pakistan, the United States, and a range of other countries. Numerous militant networks — including al Qa'ida and other foreign fighters — exist in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and North West Frontier Province. Pakistan will not be able to deal with the militant threat over the long run unless it does a more effective job of addressing the root causes of the crisis and makes security of the civilian population, rather than destroying the enemy, its top counterinsurgency priority. In addition, Pakistan needs to abandon militancy as a tool of its foreign and domestic policy; it sends a confusing message internally and has a large potential to backfire. RAND Corporation 02-06-10 Read online counterterrorism, war on terror, militancy, US policy, al Qaeda
    70 Pakistan: Can the United States Secure an Insecure State? C. Christine Fair, Keith Crane, Christopher S. Chivvis, Samir Puri, Michael Spirtas Describing Pakistan's likely future course, this book seeks to inform U.S. efforts to achieve an effective foreign policy strategy toward the country. The book forms an empirical analysis of developments in Pakistan and an assessment of the effectiveness of U.S. policy as of August 2009. Drawing on interviews of elites, polling data, and statistical data on Pakistan's armed forces, the book presents a political and political-military analysis. Primary data and analyses from Pakistanis and international economic organizations are used in the book's demographic and economic analyses. The report assesses Pakistan's own policies, based on similar sources, on government documents, and on the authors' close reading of the assessments of several outside observers. The book also discusses U.S. policy regarding Pakistan, which was based on interviews with U.S. policymakers and on U.S. policy documents. The policy recommendations are based on an assessment of the findings in all these areas. The book concludes with a number of recommendations for the U.S. government and the U.S. Air Force concerning how the United States could forge a broad yet effective relationship with this complicated state. RAND Corporation 05-04-10 Read online war on terror, US policy, insecurity, governance, terrorism, militancy
    71 Environmental Stress and Human Security in Northern Pakistan Richard Matthew Environmental and social factors are generating high levels of conflict and insecurity in Northern Pakistan. Several factors make this case an important subject for analysis and discussion: (a) the strategic location of the region; (b) the potential for far-reaching and even global consequences should conflict spill across the borders and into countries such as Afghanistan and India; and (c) the similarities between this case and many others in the world. The article concludes with policy suggestions for both domestic and foreign parties concerned about the situation. Wilson Center 07-07-11 Read online environment, extremism, terrorism, militancy, insecurity, conflict
    72 Aiding Without Abetting: Making Civilian Assistance Work for Both Sides Wilson Center This report is the culmination of a year-long working group convened to reevaluate the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act. What can be done to salvage KLB before the U.S. civilian assistance program is deemed a failure? Wilson Center 03-07-05 Read online kerry lugar berman bill, US aid, international assistance, counterterrorism, US policy, war on terror
    73 Pakistan’s Civil Society: Alternative Channels to Countering Violent Extremism - See more at: http://www.worde.org/programs/af-pak-cve-initiatives/#sthash.QP6P7jpG.dpuf Dr. Hedieh Mirahmadi, Mehreen Farooq and Waleed Ziad The report begins by exploring the rise of extremist groups in Pakistan and the avenues through which they increase their influence in society. The next section discusses government-led initiatives to counter extremism. This is followed by a broad overview of the scope and capacity of Pakistan’s civil society. Efforts to build public awareness and counter violent extremism are discussed along with challenges and limitations. The final section of the report provides recommendations for US policymakers on the potential of building the capacity of Pakistan’s civil society to improve the efficacy of existing initiatives and encourage the creation of new projects. - See more at: http://www.worde.org/programs/af-pak-cve-initiatives/#sthash.QP6P7jpG.dpuf The World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE) 01-10-12 Read online civil society, extremism, militancy, terrorism, capacity-building, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, CVE
    74 IPCS Forecasts: Pakistan's Militant Groups in 2015 D. Suba Chandran This report explores the following questions: Will the TTP implode? Will the Islamic State intrude? Will the Punjabi Taliban return to its roots? Will the Lashkar?e?Taiba (LeT) get unleashed? Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) 01-01-15 Read online Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), taliban, TTP, militancy, terrorism, 2015
    75 IPCS Forecasts: Pakistan in 2015 Salma Malik This article presents forecasts for 2015 regarding Pakistan's internal politics, counterterrorism efforts, military courts, Zarb-e-Azab, and its relations with India, Afghanistan, China and the US. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) 01-01-15 Read online civil military relations, india, china, afghanistan, US, zarb-e-azb, military courts
    76 IPCS Forecasts: Pakistan in 2015 Sushant Sareen This article presents forecasts for 2015 regarding Pakistan's civil-military relations, strategy for Jammu and Kashmir, and the rise of the Islamic State (IS). Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) 01-01-15 Read online civil military relations, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Kashmir
    77 Pakistan’s Internal Security Challenges: Will The Military Cope? Gurmeet Kanwal The greatest challenge that the new Pakistan government faces is on the national security front. The inability of the Pakistan army to meet internal security challenges effectively is a particularly worrying factor. Fissiparous tendencies in Balochistan and the restive Gilgit-Baltistan Northern Areas are a perpetual security nightmare. Karachi remains a tinderbox that is ready to explode. The Al Qaeda has gradually made inroads into Pakistani terrorist organisations like the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Harkat-ul-Jihad Al-Islami (HuJI), Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), and while it is still far from forming an umbrella organisation encompassing all of them, it is moving perceptibly in that direction. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has consolidated its position in North Waziristan despite the army’s counter-insurgency campaign and appears capable of breaking out of its stronghold to neighbouring areas. Only concerted army operations launched with single-mindedness of purpose can stop the TTP juggernaut. Over the last decade, the deteriorating internal security environment has gradually morphed into Pakistan’s foremost national security threat. The Pakistan army and its intelligence arm, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate gained considerable experience in aiding, abetting and fuelling insurgencies and terrorism in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation in the 1980s and in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and other parts of India since 1988-89. Having concentrated solely on preparing for a conventional war with India, the army had no worthwhile experience in fighting insurgencies successfully and has expectedly failed to deliver, particularly in ground operations in the picturesque Swat Valley. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) 01-08-13 Read online civil military relations, military, TTP, LeT, TNSM, governance, democracy
    78 Pakistan’s Stability: The Global Stakes PR Chari In his interaction with students in the St. Xavier’s College in Mumbai last month President Obama had stressed that “we want nothing more than a stable, prosperous, peaceful Pakistan.” Later, in New Delhi, he emphasized the need to deny terrorists safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and defeat terrorist networks like the Lashkar-e-Taiba. Pakistan should also bring the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks to justice. President Obama was greatly concerned with Pakistan’s stability as a nation state. In Mumbai he said that India is “the country with the biggest stake in Pakistan’s success. I think that if Pakistan is unstable, that’s bad for India. If Pakistan is stable and prosperous, that’s good.” His solution to alleviate the ‘security instability’ in the region was evolving trust through dialogue between India and Pakistan, addressing less controversial issues first and more contentious issues later. Currently, the Indo-Pak dialogue is in recess after the Mumbai 26/11 attacks, and incontrovertible proof becoming available of the ISI’s involvement in this episode. An early resumption of this dialogue is unlikely. Three questions arise against this backdrop to adjudge the state of stability and instability in Pakistan. Why and how has Pakistan compromised its stability? What are the implications of Pakistan’s instability for regional and international security? And, what can external actors like India and the United States do to stabilize Pakistan? Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) 01-12-10 Read online violence, terrorism, militancy, instability, regional security
    79 Pakistan & Afghanistan: Understanding Islamabad’s Objectives and Strategies Sripathi Naryanan Pakistan plays a vital role in Afghanistan and is its most prominent neighbor given its strategic location, geographical proximity, historical and cultural ties with the exception of political influence. This is further reinforced by the conflicts in Afghanistan for the past three decades, where Pakistan’s involvement was critical in Afghanistan. Besides, the porous border region of Afghanistan-Pakistan is predominantly inhabited by the Pashtun tribes. Further, the close proximity of Pakistan when compared with the other neighbours of Afghanistan is of importance. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) 01-07-10 Read online afghanistan. Af-Pak, terrorism, militancy, extremism
    80 American Military Operations inside Pakistan: Will it help the US, Pakistan and India? D. Suba Chandran Ever since the failed bombing attempt in New York’s Times Square and its link to Pakistan through Faisal Shahzad, there has been increased discussion in the US, whether Washington should consider crossing the Durand line and expand its military operations into Pakistan. This option exists, but the following questions should be answered: What will be the primary objective of the US in expanding its military operations across the Durand Line? To punish the Taliban for plotting such activities and Pakistan for not doing more? Or to effectively neutralize the Taliban infrastructure within Pakistan, so that no future attacks occur on American soil? Or to achieve American objectives in Afghanistan? Equally important are other questions. Can the US afford to increase its troops strength into Pakistan? More importantly, will this strategy make the situation better for the US on the western side of Pakistan, and for India on its eastern side? Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) 01-05-10 Read online counterterrorism, war on terror, militancy, US policy, india
    81 Extremism: Pakistan in Search of a Solution Shahid Javed Burki This paper discusses various aspects of Pakistan’s experience with Islamic extremism. More specifically, author analyzes 1) the causes of extremism in Pakistan, highlighting the role of history and geopolitical situation; 2) the economic and social costs of prolonged terrorism in Pakistan; and 3) the state’s ambiguous response to this threat and its effects. He concludes by outlining the main short and long-term components of a state strategy aimed at checking the rise of extremism. Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) 28-03-14 Read online extremism, terrorism, militancy, governance, economy
    82 Terrorism’s most devastating blow in Pakistan Shahid Javed Burki This brief addresses the implications of the Taliban terrorist attack on an army school in Peshawar in December 2014 for Pakistan. The author contends that one major outcome of the attack might be that the government takes real action against extremist groups in the state. He then discusses a number of developments that have changed the environment within which Islamic extremists operate in Pakistan and Afghanistan, including 1) the appointment of a new army head in Pakistan; 2) the end of the presidential contest in Afghanistan which saw Ashraf Ghani secure the presidency; and 3) the rise of the Islamic State (IS). Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) 23-12-14 Read online peshawar attack, TTP, militancy, military, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)
    83 Pakistani Militants Strike Back Shahid Javed Burki Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) 05-11-14 Read online militancy, terrorism, military, zarb-e-azb, governance, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
    84 Reining in the Military in Pakistan Shahid Javed Burki Three recent developments in Pakistan have taken its evolving political order forward. They will concentrate executive authority in the hands of the elected representatives of the people rather than dispersing it around in the hands of various competing institutions that are vying to establish their own control over the political system. In addition to the revival of the civilian political establishment, this process has been facilitated by two other forces – the street and the press. This paper provides an overview of these developments. Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) 06-12-13 Read online civil military relations, governance, democracy, extremism, terrorism
    85 Pakistan’s New Taliban Challenge Shahid Javed Burki The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has a new line-up of leaders in place, filling the gap created by the killing of the old leadership in an American drone attack. This shift will have major consequences for Pakistan, including in regard to the difficulties with the peace process that has been sanctioned by an All Parties Conference and is being pursued by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The TTP leadership change is taking place when the Pakistan Army is about to induct a new chief who will replace General Ashfaq Kayani and as the pace of American withdrawal from Afghanistan picks up. This paper examines the significance of a new group taking over the command of the TTP. Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) 15-11-13 Read online Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, tehreek-e-taliban pakistan (TTP), military, terrorism, extremism
    86 Pakistan: Overview of Sources of Tension with Regional Implications 2014 Safiya Aftab Having witnessed a peaceful transfer of power from one elected government to the next in 2013, Pakistan seemed poised for aperiod of political stability in 2014. This has not, however, beenthe case, with the government facing allegations of electoral fraud, anddealing with sustained street demonstrations and calls to resign from atleast one opposition party, in addition to a politico-religious group withpolitical aspirations. Similarly, the negotiation of a loan with the IMF under the Extended Fund Facility in September 2013 has not resulted in significant economic reform, and growth projections remain below potential. The country’s security situation improved, in that a major offensive against extremist groups in the tribal areas appears to have resulted in a relatively lower incidence of terrorist attacks in major cities. However, minority sects continued to be targeted by extremist groups, and incidents of persecution,discrimination and in some cases, mob violence against religious minorities,also continue unabated. The province of Balochistan remained in the gripof an insurgency, with continuing reports of excesses committed by securityagencies, and indeed by separatist groups who tend to target non-Balochcommunities. All of the above were key domestic sources of tension in thecountry in the outgoing year. Pakistan’s relations with most of its neighbours remained rocky in 2014,and the country was unable to capitalize on regime changes in bothAfghanistan and India. Relations with regional powers including Chinaand Russia remained positive or stable, although the latter continuedto be concerned about the role of Pakistani militants in the spread ofextremism in Central Asia. Relations with Saudi Arabia showed improvementafter the change of government in 2013, with the Saudi authoritiesextending significant economic support to Pakistan, albeit with somewhatopaque motives. Overall, the continued instability in Afghanistan,the aggressive posture of the new regime in India, and accusations fromIran of border incursions by militants, have soured Pakistan’s foreignrelations in the region, and constitute the key sources of tension for thecountry on the external front. Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB) 01-12-14 Read online militancy, terrorism, sectarianism, extremism, regional security, afghanistan, iran, china, russia, saudi arabia
    87 The Construction and Deconstruction of Pakistan: The Institutional Writ of the State Zahid Hussain It is indeed a huge stride forward for Pakistani democracy that, for the first time in its chequered political history, power was transferred from one elected government to another. While this uninterrupted political process is a turning point in Pakistani politics, there is still a long way to go for the struggling democracy to take root. Governance remains a major problem area in Pakistan’s quest for a sustainable democratic process. Worsening internal security, shrinking state authority and failing state institutions have undermined Pakistan’s political stability. The failure of elected governments to deliver on governance and economic stability has been a serious blow to the credibility of the democratic system among the populace, in turn strengthening undemocratic forces. Rising militancy and religious extremism are manifest in the inability of the government to deal with the twin menace, which is currently the biggest threat to the country’s security. Non-state actors have gained space, filling the vacuum created by the failure of state institutions to deliver. There has been a marked increase in ungoverned space as administrative control – even in major towns – weakens. It is not only the semi-autonomous tribal regions where the state has nominal control: even parts of Karachi – the country’s biggest city and economic jugular – have become lawless as the administrative authority has receded. The situation in the insurgency-hit western province of Balochistan is even worse. A large part of the province still does not have a formal administrative structure. The failure of tax collection is another example of the weakening of state authority and it leaves the government with few resources to develop the economic infrastructure. It also makes the country even more dependent on foreign aid. Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP has stagnated at 10 percent over the last decade and has been declining since 2009.1 The extent of tax evasion can also be assessed by the fact that just over one million entities (individuals and companies) filed their income tax returns in FY2011. In the same year, of 341 sitting members of the National Assembly, only 90 were found to have filed tax returns. The Federal Board of Revenue has failed to institute legal proceedings in spite of this wealth of information. Pakistani politics has increasingly become region-based, with even the mainstream national political parties now focusing on their provincial strongholds following the 2013 parliamentary elections in which they formed governments in their respective provinces. At present, no party has a political base in all four provinces. This regionalization of politics is manifested in an era of coalition rule and different political parties forming the government at the centre and in the provinces. A recent amendment to the country’s Constitution has created greater decentralization of economic and political decision-making down to the provincial level3. The autonomy granted to the provinces has transformed Pakistan into a truly federal state and generated a new dynamic that has affected the course of politics in the country in a more positive way, minimising the sources of friction between the provinces and the federation as well as among the provinces. This paper looks at the challenges that confront Pakistan, the political fault-lines, the problems of democratic transition, the regionalization of politics, the rising scourge of violent militancy, and shrinking state authority that have affected state institutions and the democratic process in the country. Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB) 01-06-14 Read online militancy, violence, extremism, sectarianism, balochistan, tribal areas, karachi
    88 Post 2014: The Regional Drug Economy and Its Implications for Pakistan Safiya Aftab The history of Afghanistan and what now constitutes Pakistan has been intertwined for centuries. The last three decades bear testimony to this, as three successive wars in Afghanistan have each had distinct impacts on Pakistan, ranging from increased drug abuse and proliferation of illegal arms, to a growing militant movement that draws inspiration from the Afghan Taliban. Afghanistan is now entering a critical period, with the imminent withdrawal of ISAF combat forces in 2014, and with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) assuming responsibility for maintenance of security, and law and order over large parts of the country. Afghanistan is also due to witness a change of guard politically, with presidential elections scheduled for April 2014, which will see the exit of Hamid Karzai, the two-term president who has headed the government since 2001.2 It is difficult to make any definitive statements about how events in Afghanistan will proceed post 2014, but possible scenarios include a period of stability following the elections; increased unrest in the south and south-east (albeit with Kabul remaining under the control of a strong central government); or even (in a worse case scenario) a full-fledged civil war like the one seen in the early 1990s. This paper concerns itself with how the drug trade emanating from Afghanistan, is carried further in Pakistan, and possible impacts of this trade on Pakistan’s economy and society. It looks mainly at opium, heroin and cannabis, as Afghanistan is the lead producer for these drugs, and Pakistan is a key transit country, as well as an end-use destination, in their trafficking. It also briefly explores the trade in precursors, which are also thought to transit into Afghanistan through Pakistan. The paper is, of necessity, somewhat speculative in nature, looking as it does at an undocumented trade. Nevertheless, it provides a basis for understanding the channels through which narcotics trafficking comes to impact the licit economy and can be used to influence key stakeholders. The paper begins with a brief history of the drug trade in the region over the last few years, and analyses key trends. It then assesses how drugs have impacted Pakistan’s security landscape, its political development, and its licit economy and delineates possible future scenarios. Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB) 01-02-14 Read online afghanistan, drug trade, militancy, terrorism, narcoterrorism
    89 Pakistan on the Eve of the Afghanistan Drawdown: Key Variables for the Future Owen Bennett Jones As he looks ahead to 2014 and beyond, Nawaz Sharif should have some confidence that he will complete his third term as Prime Minister. The only political parties that could challenge him, the Bhuttos’ PPP and Imran Khan’s PTI, are currently on the defensive. The PPP is trying to rebuild after a disastrous election and the PTI is grappling with the realities of holding power in Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa. Having twice been removed from office, Sharif will be mindful of the two institutions that have previously moved against him: the military and the Supreme Court. But here too he can find reasons for reassurance. The army, on the back foot after the Musharraf years, would have little popular backing for a coup. And while the ever more self-confident Supreme Court might consider itself strong enough to challenge an elected government, it would be reluctant to bring down the man who did so much to support the lawyer’s movement that restored the Chief Justice to power. Of course Pakistan’s habitually crisis-ridden political system can take unexpected, rapid turns but, by historical standards, Nawaz Sharif is in a remarkably secure position. His political agenda, however, is daunting and most notably includes major challenges in regard to militancy, the economy, governance and the external environment. Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB) 01-11-13 Read online militancy, economy, governance, karachi, terrorism,regional security
    90 Pakistan: Ungoverned Spaces Raza Ahmad Rumi Even after more than six decades since its inception, Pakistan has been unable to establish its writ across geographical boundaries and several of its territories remain ungovernable. Analysts have noted that such regions comprise nearly 60% of Pakistan's territory.1 This phenomenon has consequences for regional stability and affects peace and governance efforts in neighbouring Afghanistan, Iran, Central Asian Republics, and India. The reasons for lack of governance in Pakistan differ across regions. In some cases, the non-state actors have succeeded in establishing their own writ, emerging as alternate power centres that have supplanted the role of the state. The most notable of these are the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Balochistan, Southern Punjab and to some degree, the mega polis, Karachi. This paper seeks to examine three such regions, i.e. FATA, Balochistan and South Punjab, where the authority of the Pakistani state has diminished to varying degrees and where non-state actors effectively govern these areas. In part, this situation is a result of wilful abdication of authority by the central state (FATA), insurgency and regional dynamics (Balochistan) and nurturing of militant networks (South Punjab). The paper looks at the three regions in some detail, outlining the historical evolution of governance systems (or lack thereof) and the current situation, which has serious implications for Pakistan's security and regional stability. Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB) 01-07-12 Read online Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, balochistan, sectarianism, insurgency, South Punjab terrorism, militancy, extremism
    91 Conflict Dynamics in Sindh Huma Yusuf and Syed Shoaib Hasan Pakistan’s southern province of Sindh has a reputation for stability, diversity, and tolerance. It is also at a tipping point—increasingly threatened by violent extremism, crime, political corruption, tribal feuds, and nationalist and separatist movements. If the province is not to become yet another base for militants, as areas to the north already are, the government needs to act promptly and decisively. Addressing the security situation in Sindh is also integral to stabilizing Karachi, which should be a top priority, given the economic ramifications of growing turbulence in the country’s financial capital. United States Institute of Peace (USIP) 26-01-15 Read online conflict, violence, governance, extremism, terrorism, separatism, Sindh
    92 Pakistan’s Resurgent Sectarian War Arif Rafiq The violence across the Middle East has energized sectarian militant networks on both sides of the conflict in Pakistan. This report gives an overview of the history of conflict between Sunni Deobandi and Shia militant and political organizations in Pakistan and offers warnings about further radicalization there and its effects on the politics of the state. United States Institute of Peace (USIP) 05-11-14 Read online sectarian conflict, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), shia-sunni conflict, extremism, terrorism
    93 Religious Authority and the Promotion of Sectarian Tolerance in Pakistan Michael Kalin and Niloufer Siddiqui Sunni-Shia tensions have been a recurrent problem in Pakistan for more than three decades, as domestic and international factors have polarized sectarian identities. Recently, the Shia minority has suffered the brunt of the violence. This report examines what has fostered intolerance and tolerance between Sunnis and Shias in Pakistan and the role that religious authorities may play in reducing sectarian prejudice. United States Institute of Peace (USIP) 23-10-14 Read online sectarian conflict, shia-sunni conflict, extremism, terrorism, religious groups
    94 A Counterterrorism Role for Pakistan’s Police Stations Robert Perito and Tariq Parvez Violence is escalating in Pakistan, both in its megacities and along the border with Afghanistan—from terrorism, to secessionist insurgency, to sectarian conflict, to ethnic turf wars. The police station and the police who staff it, despite their historic role as a symbol of government authority and responsibility for public order, are woefully ill prepared and ill equipped to meet these challenges. This report, part of a project to increase Pakistan’s capacity to combat terrorism, explores the role police stations could and should play and suggests definitive steps to that end. United States Institute of Peace (USIP) 18-08-14 Read online terrorism, separatism, sectarianism, law enforcement agencies, police, counterterrorism
    95 Maximizing the Impact of Aid to Pakistan: Leverage Reform and Local Capacity Richard Albright Overcoming Pakistan's many challenges, and meeting the development needs of its people, requires working through the institutions of Pakistani governance if sustainable impacts are to be achieved. U.S. aid, if offered consistently and in support of systemic institutional reform, can have a valuable catalytic role to assist and incentivize these efforts. United States Institute of Peace (USIP) 28-07-14 Read online war on terror, economic aid, US assistance, governance
    96 Youth Radicalization in Pakistan Raheem ul Haque Amid the serious threat of extremism within Pakistan’s large young adult population, author Raheem ul Haque explores the process of youth radicalization and recommends how policymakers can best confront the growing challenge. United States Institute of Peace (USIP) 26-02-14 Read online islamism, radicalization, youth, democracy, 2013 elections
    97 Mapping Conflict Trends in Pakistan Saira Yamin and Salma Malik Over the past decade, violence has become endemic in many parts of Pakistan. This report examines the trajectory of violence and the range of conflicts in six troubled regions. The authors conclude that if existing socioeconomic conditions persist and the state continues to fail to deliver public services, justice, and security, Pakistan could face further escalation of violence and lawlessness. United States Institute of Peace (USIP) 07-02-14 Read online conflict, violence, governance, extremism, terrorism, conflict trends
    98 Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan Stephen Tankel Pakistan will continue to find it difficult to counter militancy more vigorously in its territory, and U.S. officials urging the country to make greater efforts should fully understand the obstacles. One is the Pakistan security establishment’s penchant for supporting militant groups it believes might have strategic uses while ignoring those it believes have no strategic value. But there are other obstacles, including lack of funding, bureaucratic barriers, and public opinion. United States Institute of Peace (USIP) 09-09-13 Read online militancy, jihadism, islamism, counterterrorism,
    99 Pakistan and the Narratives of Extremism Amil Khan Violent extremist organizations in Pakistan have effectively drawn on existing narratives about Pakistan’s history and identity in promoting their own worldviews. An effective communications strategy to counter extremism likewise needs to engage existing narratives, as well as engaging youth and others who are already challenging extremist views. United States Institute of Peace (USIP) 08-03-13 Read online al Qaeda, extremist narrative, terrorism, militancy
    100 Understanding Pakistan's Water-Security Nexus Daanish Mustafa, Majed Akhter, and Natalie Nasralla Pakistan faces unprecedented stresses on its water resources from inequitable distribution, population growth, urbanization, and shifts in production and consumption patterns, and these water problems exacerbate local tensions. Solutions to Pakistan’s water crisis must focus on addressing unsustainable practices and gross mismanagement, say the authors of this new report. United States Institute of Peace (USIP) 14-05-13 Read online water, security, conflict, instability, terrorism


  • SrPublication (links)Author(s)SummaryOrganizationDateKeywords
    1 Understanding the Dynamics of Conflict and Peacebuilding in Pakistan Search for Common Ground Pakistan (SFCG) and Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) This report contains the abridged baseline studies for two projects currently being implemented by Search for Common Ground Pakistan (SFCG) in partnership with other Pakistani organizations. The study titled 'Perception among Youth and Community Leaders about Conflict' was conducted for SFCG's project 'Promotion of Dialogue for Peacebuilding through Media and Youth Mobilization in Pakistan', which is supported by the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA). Since 2011, SFCG has been implementing this project in partnership with Intermedia Pakistan, Uks Resource Center, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Pakistan Press Foundation and Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation. The project covers 25 districts across Pakistan's four provinces (including the Northern Areas and Azad Jammu & Kashmir) with the aim to strengthen Pakistan's fragile context by shifting attitudes and behaviors of the Pakistani population away from adversarial, intolerant approaches towards greater tolerance, inclusiveness and understanding among the country's various regional, ethnic and socio-ethnic groups. The project engages youth and local leaders, as well as television, radio and print journalists, and is designed to increase their capacity to play an active role in creating peace and promoting tolerance and co-existence. It additionally provides the beneficiaries with platforms to apply their new skills in conflict analysis, mediation, dialogue and leadership. More information about the project can be found at: http://www.pakistanpeaceinitiative.net.pk/. The study titled 'Perception of Youth and Policymakers about Peacebuilding Methods in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and FATA', was conducted for SFCG's project 'Promoting Peace in KPK and FATA – Connecting Youth Non-State Actors (NSAs) and Policymakers through Mediation and Dialogue', which is supported by the European Union. Since 2012, SFCG has been implementing this project in partnership with PAIMAN Alumni Trust. The project covers 25 districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas with the aim of contributing towards peace and reconciliation in Pakistan by promoting mediation and dialogue in the target region. The project is building the capacity of youth and policymakers from KPK and FATA in mediation and dialogue, and provides platforms for the youth to interact, network and build sustainable relationships with local policymakers. Additionally, the project activities provide youth opportunities to play a leadership role in their districts, engage collaboratively with elders and local influentials, and play a role in decision making processes. More information about the project can be found at: http://peacepromoters.net.pk/. Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) 01-01-13 peacebuilding, youth, extremism, militancy, terrorism, tolerance, inclusiveness, CVE
    2 Searching for Security: The Rising Marginalization of Religious Communities in Pakistan Shikha Dilawri, Ahmad Salim, Mome Saleem, Dr. Humera Ishfaq Though religious communities such as Ahmadis, Christians and Hindus have suffered discrimination in Pakistan for decades, their persecution has intensified in recent years and has now reached critical levels. Despite some signs of progress, their situation continues to be characterized by denigration, the frequent use of blasphemy laws and increasingly deadly attacks on places of worship. This insecurity not only exposes them to the threat of death and injury, but also reinforces their exclusion from political participation, basic services, education and employment. As a result, large numbers have been forced to emigrate from the country. There has also been an upsurge of sectarian violence against the Shi'a Muslim community, particularly Hazara Shi’a.Drawing on an extensive review of published research and interviews with a range of activists and representatives, this report explores the key drivers of Pakistan’s continued religious discrimination. Among other factors, the report highlights the persistence of deeply entrenched rights gaps in the country’s constitution and legal framework. This includes significant barriers to political participation, underdeveloped or non-existent recognition of non-Muslim marriages, unequal judicial procedures and a frequent unwillingness among law enforcement agencies to enforce legal protections against discrimination. In particular, the country’s blasphemy laws continue to be applied against many Pakistanis, including disproportionate numbers of religious minority members, with little respect for the rights of those accused and in violation of Pakistan’s international legal commitments. Furthermore, this discrimination translates at a societal level to widespread prejudice against minorities, perpetuated in workplaces, schools, media and even communal burial sites, where, in a number of recent incidents, deceased minority members have been barred or disinterred by local extremists. Hate speech and negative representations of religious minorities remain commonplace in certain media and are still perpetuated in some educational materials. Similarly, religious minorities continue to face barriers in accessing employment opportunities in many sectors, including public organizations, despite the existence of quotas within federal government agencies. They are in fact disproportionately concentrated in poorly paid, stigmatized or exploitative working conditions, including bonded labour. This backdrop of discrimination enables and facilitates continued violence against religious minorities. Addressing these institutional and social inequalities is essential if security for members of Pakistan’s religious minorities is to be restored. Their persecution in Pakistan is both a cause and a symptom of the broader deterioration in human rights and governance. The protection of these groups, in collaboration with civil society groups, religious leaders, law enforcement agencies and other stakeholders, is therefore an urgent priority for the government in its campaign to restore effective governance in the country. Failure to do so will not only continue to threaten the country’s diversity, but also the future stability of the country as a whole. Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) 26-11-11 minority rights, extremism, radicalization, islamism, blasphemy, sectarian conflict
    3 Perception Survey on Reconciliation in Malakand Division United Nations Development Programme Pakistan (UNDP) and Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) Perception survey on reconciliation in Malakand Division was conducted in March and April 2012 by the SDPI in collaboration with the UNDP. The survey was conducted in 06 districts of Malakand Division including; Buner, Malakand, Lower Dir, Shangla, Swat and Upper Dir. The survey was aimed at providing data analysis, impacts and perception about reconciliation among the indigenous population of Malakand Division. The objective of the survey is to inform and support development agencies, government and other stakeholders to develop and implement informed programme in the areas focusing around reconstruction, conflict prevention and building sustainable peace. The methodology of the survey included both quantitative and qualitative tools; 2000 households' survey and 180 key informant interviews. Instruments for the survey were developed through rigorous consultation with the concerned stakeholders including academia, civil society, district government officials, NGOs/INGOs representatives, religious leaders etc. The survey report comprises of four chapters that encompasses background and methodology, literature review, findings from the field, analysis and recommendations. The second chapter presents a review of the existing literature on conflict, peace building, reconciliation and short history of Swat; specifically focusing on Malakand region in context of the recent conflict. The chapter sets a tone to understand the nature and dynamics of the conflict. In the light of different scholars and sociologists, class and social discriminations are the basic under lying factor behind the conflict within a society. Moreover, scholars also believe that religion plays a significant role in bringing about a conflict; where a group fight with the state over establishing specific religious traditions and rule in the state. The reasons for conflict in Swat also revolved around the same concepts where social disparities increased after the merger of princely state into Pakistan; hence giving conducive environment to the external forces to fulfill their interest. Religion was highlighted as the key objective of the conflict by the militants who later resorted to looting and killing of innocent people and spread terror in the society. The third chapter focuses on the findings of the field survey. It explores the local understanding and perception of the people regarding the underlying reasons of the militant conflict, impacts that conflict has generated and the perception about reconciliation and sustainable peace within the society. It further understands the local dynamics of conflict gauged through the field assessment and tools that will help building peace in a social setting. The findings from the field illustrate that the external forces were able to exploit the already unstable socioeconomic state of the people of Malakand Division. Female and poor were denied the right to quality education. Moreover, the low level of education and understanding of religious dynamics led to flourishing of several fundamentalist ideologies. The quality of health suffered due to lack of staff in the public hospitals; such as doctors and lady doctors for women. Justice was expensive, prolonged, and unreliable due to corruption; where rich and powerful influenced the decision. Traditional Justice System such as Jirga was prevalent in the area where women did not get enough representation. Reconciliation is perceived to be arbitration among the two groups, however in case of Malakand Division the counter party for reconciliation is missing as the insurgents were not native and the land of Malakand was used to fulfill their interest and the interest of those who backed them. However, to reduce the vulnerability of people and to sustain peace in the region, respondents indicated the dire need to address the socio- economic problems of people who were suffering before the conflict and bore the aftermath of the conflict. Poverty alleviation and access to speedy justice were some of the main issues highlighted by the respondents in all districts. The final Chapter deals with the analysis of the findings; hence indicating how the conflict arose and led to a volatile situation. Now that the conflict has transformed, there is a need to address the issues that can lead to future conflict. This chapter recommends the programme and those involved in the reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation in the region to address issues pertaining to social disparities. These included ethnic and class differences, improving quality of education and health, provision of livelihood patterns especially for youth and women, giving rights to the marginalized such as women, social, economic and political justice, individual and social security for all, awareness raising about religion and ethical values, and giving opportunities to the youth for constructive use of their strengths. Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) 01-01-12 Malakand Division, reconciliation, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, conflict, militancy, terrorism, extremism
    4 Assessing the Role of the Private Sector in Conflict Prevention in Pakistan Safwan A. Khan, Vaqar Ahmed Pakistan today seems to be embroiled in a number of conflicts that have both domestic as well as international dimensions. Conflicts of course vary, ranging from household disputes to increasing crime resulting from disparities. However, at an aggregated level, conflicts have a societal connotation that reflects deep-rooted divisions within a society. On a macro-level, these conflicts suppress a country’s potential and inhibit future prosperity. Hence, investor confidence has declined in Pakistan as have market opportunities. The poor law and order situation in Karachi over the last few years, for example, has significantly affected the income of daily wage earners, while investors have taken a back seat. Moreover, entrepreneurial activity becomes even more difficult to pursue for those with less capital or access to financing. With the rise in conflicts across the country coupled with a bleak economic situation, communities and businesses have suffered alike. Economic disparities often breed sustained conflicts. In this context, what is needed in Pakistan is an economic environment that engenders strategic peace. The two are complementing factors, and neglecting either can seriously undermine the effectiveness of measures taken for the other. This research study, conducted by Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) in 2013, undertook an analysis of the private sector’s role in achieving sustainable peace in Pakistan. It is important to note that as far as sustainable peace is concerned, the private sector is just one of many actors. In that, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives by businesses can certainly play an important role. Their main contribution, however, can be to influence public policy in favor of strategic peace across the country. While approaches such as dispute resolution (formal and informal) and CSR are important in terms of conflict mitigation, long-term peace is contingent upon a just and equitable system of economic governance. Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) 01-12-12 private sector, civil society, conflict preventation, militancy, terrorism
    5 Effects of Militancy and the Impact Trends of Rehabilitation in Malakand Division Dr. Syed Nazre Hyder, Gulbaz Ali Khan, Kanwar Muhammad Javed Iqbal, Muhammad Tahir, Maqsood Ahmad A wave of terrorism and insurgency erupted and gradually gained momentum during the last decade in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). Violence unleashed by extremist groups reached a climax during 2007 as militants bombed public places, schools, places of worship and hospitals and adopted other forms of violence such as targeted killings and kidnapping for ransom. The epicenter of the catastrophe was the tribal areas comprising Malakand and Federally Administered Areas of KP. The massive destruction impelled the authorities to seek assistance of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank to assess the extent of damages, cost of rehabilitation and to recommend strategies to comprehensively address the problems responsible for the crisis. A comprehensive ‘Preliminary Damage and Need Assessment’ (DNA) was consequently launched in 2009 with the primary objective of assessing the losses suffered in the areas affected by militancy. The main focus was on quantification of immediate and medium term reconstruction and recovery cost in Malakand Division (Buner, Lowe Dir, Upper Dir, Shangla and Swat) of KP and two agencies of Bajaur and Mohmand in FATA. The study has been initiated at the request of the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Strengthening PRS and Monitoring Project of UNDP and aims at conducting a comprehensive academic investigation to evaluate the effects of militancy and the impact trend of rehabilitation. The objective is to provide input for fine tuning the future policies and programmes for these areas and to address their needs on the basis of research investigation in the sampled area. Although the earlier studies have comprehensively dealt with the assessment of damages incurred, their rehabilitation cost and the factors responsible for the crisis, their findings have been supplemented and updated with a probe into the latest situation on ground. The latest position is summed up in the paragraphs that follow.. The education sector in the affected areas is comprised of both public and private schools. However, most of the schools are public sector institutions and very few are run privately . . The militants threatened the administration and teaching staff and targeted the primary schools, especially girls’ schools. Multifarious reasons led to a sharp decline in the attendance and enrolment ratios which touched the lowest levels in the history of the Malakand Division. Rehabilitation activities have been undertaken at the right time by the GoKP with the support of the international donors including USAID and UAE. The enrollment rate has surpassed the premilitancy position due to the provisional arrangement of make-shifts schools in tents and rented buildings. In addition to the support provided by GoKP, CSOs are also playing a vital role in bringing back the education sector to its previous position. It is important to mention that the community members and especially the parents are satisfied with the rehabilitation process. The ongoing uplift activities in education sector may take more than five years to complete the rehabilitation process. Health care services remained non-functional due to the damages mostly to the basic health units. The large scale migration from the region also caused the non-availability of doctors at the rural/basic health units. Findings reveal that those who were serving prior to the outbreak of militancy are now refusing to serve again in the same health care units. PaRRSA reviewed and 10 verified the damaged health infrastructures and demanded US7.0 million for the revival of health care services. GoKP signed MoUs with the international donors for the timely recovery of basic health units and restoration of their services. Additionally, USAID has also devised a comprehensive health care delivery programme for the Malakand Division. USAID also supplied equipments for improved functioning of these basic health providers. Although the GoKP is actively engaged in rehabilitation of health sector, the pace of work is not satisfactorily. That is why the community and the health officials are not satisfied with the ongoing rehabilitation effort. Transport is one of the major businesses of the valley due to its significance in the local economic structure as it drives tourism, businesses and livelihoods. Prior to militancy, the Swat district was well connected through the local roads as well as the highways. All the roads and bridges were badly damaged due to blasts by the militants and movement of army tanks to counter militancy. Among other transport, inter-city transport such as coaches, medium sized vehicles and commercial pickup services were severely damaged due to the destruction of roads and bridges, causing a big loss to the transporters of the district. Owing to shortage of transport facilities, a sharp decline was observed in the traffic of tourists towards the valley. Temporary bridges were installed by the army which were still in use by the local community both for personal and commercial purposes. The roads used by the army against the militants have not yet been fixed due to lack of payments to the local government NHA and provincial C&W. The army is also involved in rebuilding the road infrastructure. These agencies are proceeding in accordance with the policy and strategies of the GoKP. Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) 01-01-12 Malakand Division, rehabilitation, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, conflict, militancy, terrorism, extremism
    6 Crisis in Balochistan: Challenges and Opportunities Mir Sher Baz Khetran Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI) 22-08-11 balochistan, separatist movement, militancy, insurgency, governance
    7 Resistance and its Progression to Insurgency Ambreen Javed Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI) 12-01-10 resistance, insurgency, militancy, terrorism, violent conflict
    8 Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and the Jamaat-ud-Dawa: The Case for a Pakistani Narrative Mohammad Waqas Sajjad and Ahmad Jawad Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI) 03-02-12 lashkar-e-taiba (LeT), Jamaat-ud-Dawa, extremism, terrorism, militancy,
    9 Jihad: Conflict-Resolution or its Antithesis? Aqab M. Malik Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI) 12-02-13 jihad, militancy, islamism, violent conflict, terrorism
    10 Psychological Assessment Report of Red Mosque Students Rizwan Taj and Asima Khan The present documentation details the psychological assessment and debriefing report of madrasa students at the Sports Stadium, Islamabad, prepared by the Pakistan Institute of Medical Sciences (PIMS). At the directive of the prime minister of Pakistan, a team of 11 mental health professionals was set up for psychological assessment and debriefing of madrasa students at the Sports Complex on Sunday, July 8, 2007. The team was divided into four groups and was supervised and briefed by the head of the department of psychiatry, PIMS. More than one hundred and thirty students were assessed. They were between the ages of 15 to 20 years, and most were from the NWFP and a few from AJK. Nearly all were from a poor background with large families. On site we were facilitated by the Islamabad commissioner's office. Analyses showed that these students were comfortable in their present scenarios. Yet, they remained somewhat oblivious of their surroundings and also to new information. Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI) 25-01-10 education, militancy, madrassah reform, extremism, terrorism, red mosque
    11 Militancy and Socioeconomic Problems: A Case Study of Pakistan Arshad Ali This paper is an attempt to explore the possible linkage between militancy and the socioeconomic situation prevailing in Pakistan. It examines the possible links between the incidence of poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, health and radicalization or the growth of militancy. Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI) 30-05-10 militancy, economy, poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, health, radicalization
    12 Pakistan Conflict Tracker – Annual Security Report 2014 Mohammad Nafees This annual report analyzes violence in Pakistan empirically, using factual data and the pattern of violence drawn from the incidents of crimes committed in the country. Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) 01-03-15 violence, militancy, terroism, crime, sectarian conflict, 2014
    13 The 21st Amendment Act of Pakistan – A Matter of Serious Concern for Islamist Parties in Pakistan Dr. Farhan Zahid This paper explores the question of why Pakistan's islamist parties boycotted the voting sessions for the said amendments. Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) 01-03-15 21st amendment, islamist parties, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI), politics, parliament terrorism, extremism
    14 Al-Qaeda’s Islamabad Cell Dr. Farhan Zahid and Dr. Andrew McGregor The article provides a case study of an urban terrorist cell in Pakistan’s capital of Islamabad that successfully carried out a wave of assassination and bombings of “high-value” targets and individuals from 2007 to 2013. This cell effectively formed a means for Core al-Qaeda and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to pressure the Pakistani government from their headquarters in the tribal territories of northwest Pakistan. The “success” of the cell relied on a number of factors and practices, including the careful selection of members based on the usefulness of their family connections, the middle-class background of its operatives, intimate knowledge of its urban surroundings and its reliance on specially trained suicide bombers brought in from the tribal regions rather than local individuals. Of particular interest is the role of family members (including those in senior roles in the security services) in aiding and abetting “second generation” jihadists. Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) 01-01-70 al-Qaeda, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), terrorism, extremism, militancy, Islamabad
    15 The TTP Imbroglio: Staying with Al-Qaeda or Pledging Allegiance to Islamic State of Iraq and Sham? Dr. Farhan Zahid The rise of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and its proclamation of Islamic Caliphate on Iraq and Syrian territories controlled by ISIS, has surprised even the jihadi organizations operating in different parts of the world. Pakistani Islamist terrorist organizations and their splinter groups are indecisive about responding to the establishment of Caliphate as achieving Caliphate is one of their primary objectives. The Islamic State has managed to achieve scores of victories against standing armies of Syria and Iraq and controls a territory almost the size of Belgium. The size of the areas under Islamic States appear to grow even further as weak states like Iraq and Syria are in no position to defend their own territories. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) the most dangerous of all Pakistani Islamist jihadi groups have responded cautiously. The TTP has neither rejected ISIS's claims nor approved of it. The TTP and a plethora of other Islamist terrorist groups active in Pakistan have a strong and long standing relationship with Al-Qaeda. Since ISIS was once part of Al-Qaeda1 and used to be an Al-Qaeda franchise, therefore, joining hands with ISIS despite ISIS's tremendous record of successes perhaps creating problems for Pakistani Islamist groups especially the TTP. Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) 01-12-14 al-Qaeda, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), terrorism, extremism, militancy, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
    16 Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent Dr. Farhan Zahid This article analyzes al-Qaeda's resurgence in the Indian subcontinent Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) 01-01-70 al-Qaeda, Indian Subcontinent, South Asia terrorism, extremism, militancy
    17 Pakistan’s Challenges in Anti-Terror Legislation Sitwat Waqar Bokhari Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) 12-11-13 parliament, legislation, counterterrorism, militancy, terrorism, extremism
    18 State in Turmoil Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) This paper analyzes the impact of drone attacks, security situation in Pakistan in 2012, prevailing violence in Karachi, the situation in Balochistan, and the evolution of media in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and FATA Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) 01-01-70 drone attacks, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Karachi, violence, Balochistan, insurgency, militancy, terrorism, extremism
    19 Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan: A Historical Overview Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) This article traces the historical evolution of blasphemy laws in Pakistan and presents an account of misuse of such laws. Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) 01-04-13 blasphemy, legislation, parliament, minorities, extremism, islamism
    20 Sunni Ittehad Council: The Strengths and Limitations of Barelvi Activism against Terrorism Aarish U. Khan Several Barelvi leaders joined hands for an alliance, the Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC), in May 2009 to work and guard against religious extremism and terrorism. The move seemed to be influenced by a gradual escalation of attacks on shrines across Pakistan since late 2006, as well as the on the Barelvi (Sufi) community that venerates these places. Presumably, pro-Al-Qaeda Pakistani militant organizations orchestrate these attacks on places which are frequented by thousands of followers every day. SIC has been able to achieve some successes but in the socio-political maize of Pakistan, this alliance, too, is hamstrung by limitations. This paper attempts to briefly look at the history of attacks on shrines, explain the achievements of SIC and analyze its limitations in an environment loaded with violence and sectarian differences, which Al-Qaeda-inspired militants - also called "Force Multipliers of Al Qaeda" - appear to exploit every now and then. Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) 01-05-11 sunni ittehad council (SIC), barelvi islam, militancy, terrorism
    21 Pakistan Security Challenges Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) This report draws a distinction between "structural" and "trigger" causes of instability. Based on a wide range of interviews with important stake-holders across the social, political, economic and military spectrum, the Centre was able to pinpoint the Objectives' Resolution, the unbalanced civil-military relations, absence of good governance, inter-provincial disharmony, the armed forces' predominance of foreign policy, the country's geography, the vague status of FATA, as some of the structural causes of instability. On the other hand, some of the events of international dimensions such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the post 9/11 war on terror, Pakistani military operations in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa regions, the tendency among smaller/regional parties like the MQM and the JUI to exploit bigger parties in power-sharing stand out as trigger causes of instability. Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) 01-03-11 instability, security, violence, terrorism, Balochistan, Karachi
    22 Pakistan During 2010 – Challenges Faced by the State and Society Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) Year 2010 has been yet another challenging year in the series since Pakistan joined the war on terror an ally to the US and NATO. Surrounded by challenges on its Eastern and Western borders, the Pakistani State and Society found them in a whirlwind of national and international issues pertaining to democracy at home and peace and security in region and the world. In this report, the Center for Research and Security Studies, Islamabad, has reviewed the situation vis?à?vis the three most crucial issues facing the Pakistani State and the Society i.e. Extremism, Democracy at Home and the Handling of the Devastating Floods, and Pakistan's Foreign Relations. Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) 02-02-11 extremism, terrorism, militancy, 2010
    23 Cost of Conflict in Pakistan Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) This study seeks to understand the costs of conflict accrued by Pakistani state and people as a result of their participation in US-led War on Terror. Firstly, it tries to understand and diagnose the scenario in which Pakistan was linked with Afghanistan in President Obama's new policy in the region. Secondly it underscores the cost of this conflict that Pakistan is paying and would be paying in the foreseeable future. Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) 01-03-10 economy, human loss, casualties, statistics, extremism, terrorism, war on terror
    24 Extremism Watch: Mapping Conflict Trends in Pakistan 2011 – 2012 Jinnah Institute 2012 saw previous patterns of violence against religious minorities continue to be repeated, often with greater intensity. This report documents the increase in bombings at Sufi shrines, the rising spate of Hazara and Shia killings, as well as other acts of religious extremism and sectarian violence committed in the country. It aims to highlight the magnitude of our collective challenge in combating extremism, which has gathered new momentum and ferocity. Whilst there is an evident concentration of violence in certain parts of the country, no part of Pakistan is unaffected by violent extremism and radicalism. In many cases, incidents led by intolerance and bigotry are more diffuse, often blurring the distinction between acts of terrorism and extremism. In this report, an attempt has been made to isolate incidents of religious extremism and analyse their violent and non-violent manifestations. The metrics used for identifying these trends of extremism have been detailed at length in the section titled ‘Conflict Trends’. Statistics pertaining to interfaith conflict, sectarian violence, attacks against schools, shrines and mosques, as well as blasphemy related cases have been presented. Jinnah Institute 01-01-13 extremism, terrorism, militancy, 2011, 2012
    25 Policy Brief: Political Integration and Affirmative Legislation for Minorities in Pakistan Peter Jacob The recent spate of violence against Pakistan’s religious minorities culminated in the dehumanizing murder of Shama and Shehzad – a Christian couple from Kot Radha Kishan. The couple were beaten and subsequently burnt to death in the brick kiln where they worked over a purported blasphemy allegation that was used as a cover for a financial dispute. This incident – along with others such as the destruction of Joseph Colony and the Gojra riots – sheds light on a disturbing schism that has crystallised in Pakistani society, with religious minorities being relegated to the position of socio-religious Other. This pervasive antagonism needs to be tackled on multiple fronts. The negligible presence and participation of minorities in the public sphere is one such front. The Supreme Court attempted to rectify this discrepancy in a landmark decision delivered on the 19th of June 2014, which strongly emphasized the need for minority integration and offered a somber observation on the treatment meted out to minorities in Pakistan: “It requires a strong moral courage for an individual or a nation to apologize for having wronged a community. It is time for us as a nation and as individuals to have a moment of reflection, a moment of soul searching and perhaps a moment of reckoning to ask ourselves; have we lived by the pledges made in…the Constitution and by the vision of Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah” The idea of integrating minorities in the political life of a country gained wider currency globally as it became apparent that progress required institutional responses to rid societies of different forms of discrimination. Inclusive political participation of minorities contributed to sustainable development, peace and justice. Jinnah Institute 24-12-14 extremism, minorities, violence, religious groups, islamism, blasphemy
    26 Policy Brief: Developing a Progressive Internet Policy for Pakistan Jahanzaib Haque Increasing levels of internet use and accessibility have given rise to significant challenges across the world; Pakistan has not been an exception. However, the response to these challenges at the official level in Pakistan has been disappointing. Internet policy and regulation is beset by a number of problems, including a dearth of necessary laws to govern online activity, threat of local and global monitoring, surveillance and cyber warfare, and increasing use of social media platforms to spread hate speech and terror literature. In the absence of concrete measures to address these challenges through a progressive internet policy, there can be little that can be reaped from the opportunities that internet provides across a wide spectrum of fields. This policy brief specifies five key challenges within the realm of internet policy and regulation in Pakistan and presents recommendations to address them. Jinnah Institute 30-01-15 liberalism, internet security, internet freedom, cyber crimes